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Preface
PERIODICALLY, the thoughtful scientist will take
pause from his research activity to reflect upon the kind of
description the facts he is uncovering are constraining him
to make of the universe in which he lives-indeed, even
of himself. He asks himself about the quality of the knowl
edge he is acquiring. He asks himself about the certainty
of that knowledge. Some scientists answer the question
about certainty simply and devastatingly. They deny that
there is anything certain about knowledge. Their skep
ticism renders any attempt to draw conclusions from the
raw data of experiment an operation that merely increases
uncertainty. There is a school of thought which likes to
vent its disdain for all it considers inferior knowledge upon
that much-abused and misunderstood word, mysticism.
As the physicist ponders over the insight his findings are
giving him into "objective reality" he finds himself look
ing into his own mind, and the material instrument
through which mind works, the brain. How well does this
mind get into contact with things outside itself? Indeed,
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does it make such contact at all, or does it merely fabricate
"evidence"? The chronic doubter is inclined to embrace
this fabrication theory. He keeps asking himself whether
he is dreaming, or insane. In so doing, is he not supposing
that there is something in him, ultra-real, not depending
on his senses for its knowledge, which sits in judgment
over all the avenues by which knowledge comes into his
conscious, or subconscious, self?
Scientists know that their research has made contribu
tions to many areas of human endeavor. The fruits of re
search have made it possible for man's body to travel
faster than the sound of his voice. They have lengthened
life. They have entered the field of language and are mak
ing translation by machine a reality. They have come to
the aid of the paleontologist to help him in the difficult
task of dating his archeological findings. Can it be pos
sible, then, that science may have an important contribu
tion to make to our everyday deportment, the "ought" in
our lives? Do the laws of nature have any bearing on the
laws of behavior?
A study of the nature of knowledge demands that we in
quire whether there is knowledge, or whether there are
knowledges-all valid, yet different. This could lead to the
further question whether what is "assumed" in one knowl
edge may not be an evidence in another.
Simplicity, transsubjectivity, and intersubjectivity are
among the criteria accepted by scientists for testing the
validity of the knowledge of science. How sound are these?
Do they assume something more fundamental, which is
neither self-evident nor demonstrable? If demonstration is
needed, this itself becomes a subject of our concern. We
need to inquire whether deductive reasoning is excessively
susceptible to the fallacy of the consequent. Inductive rea
soning, fruitful though it is, appears incapable of yielding
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conclusions that are any better than probable. Only
unswerving consistency maintained throughout the per•
formance of all possible experiments, quantitative and
qualitative, on a particular phenomenon in nature could
bring true certainty. Quantitatively, approach to infinity
in number of experiments would usually seem to be re
quired for absolute certitude.
The advent of quantum mechanics has compounded the
epistemological problems of the physicist. He is less certain
than ever about the ultimate unit of material reality, since
reality seems to manifest itself to him both as a particle
and as a wave. Is one of these an illusion? Is the wave in
quantum mechanics no more than a probability amplitude?
Have we unwittingly assigned the same objective reality
to a statistical table as we assign to the events that supplied
the data for the table? Is nature quanta}? Is it dualistic?
These are some of the questions and problems upon
which the participants in this symposium have touched
directly, or indirectly. They are fundamental. They are
important. Physicists want to broaden their outlook. They
want to evaluate their work in terms of a broad and valid
insight into all of reality. This symposium was organized
in the hope that some contribution would be made toward
an all-embracing view of reality, which may some day serve
as a frame of reference for evaluating the scientist's con
cepts of the real.
Professor Henry Margenau of Yale University suggested
this symposium in March of 1958 and agreed to participate
in it. The Council of the American Physical Society con
sented to placing it on the program of its 1959 "Summer
Meeting in the East" at Milwaukee. Professor Margenau's
aid in organizing the symposium and in securing partici
pants was invaluable. Gratitude is due to Professor Frank
Collingwood of Marquette University, who aided in or-
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ganizing the subject matter, and who graciously agreed to
being moved from his initially assigned role of discussant
to that of one of the principal lecturers, thus to take the
place of Professor Philipp Frank, who had been scheduled
as a principal lecturer but found it impossible to attend
the meeting. Valuable financial help was kindly contrib
uted by The Milwaukee Journal and the Falk Corporation.
Portions of Chapter 3 are used by permission of Yale
University Press, publishers of Professor Henry Mar
genau's Open Vistas: Philosophical Perspectives of Mod
ern Science.
Some of the papers presented at the meeting have been
revised by their authors for publication.
It is the hope of those who participated in this sym
posium that it has made at least some contribution to the
physicist's understanding of the nature of his knowledge,
and that it has helped to narrow, even if only slightly, the
gap of misunderstanding which exists between so many
physicists and philosophers.
L. W. FRIEDRICH, S.J.

Marquette University
November 6, 1959
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I
The Nature of Physical "Knowledge"
P. W. BRIDGMAN

IT IS desirable to begin by trying to make more
precise the meaning of our terms and the scope of the
proposed analysis. As first formulated, the title proposed
for this symposium was The Nature of Physical Knowl
edge. The physicist was not explicitly mentioned in this
formulation. In its general usage I think the word physical
implies something broader than physics or the physicist,
and suggests all the so-called physical sciences, including
physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, and practically
all biology as practiced by the biologist today. Not in
cluded in the implications are the social sciences and
the humanities. The status of psychology is perhaps more
doubtful, for it has aspects both physical and humanitarian.
In what I have to say I shall be concerned, not narrowly
with physics, but with what would by general understand
ing be considered the physical aspects of any of the several
sciences.
The originally proposed title was subject to some dis
cussion by correspondence with several of the participants
13
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and at one time appeared in the form The Nature of the
"Knowledge" of the Physicist, a form that I suggested and
particularly approved. This wording, however, got lost
somewhere in the shuffle, and the final formulation that
appears on the program is the same as the original except
that there the word knowledge appeared unadorned,
whereas in the final version it appears in quotation marks.
This change was made at my suggestion in order to avoid
what seemed to me the implication in the original formula
tion that there is such a thing as knowledge in general,
and that the physical scientist is concerned with only a
special kind of this general knowledge, of which there may
be other kinds, such, perhaps, as the knowledge of the
mystic. We here encounter distinctions which to a certain
extent are only verbal, but in any event the operational
background of the so-called knowledge of the physical
scientist is so different from the operational background
of the so-called knowledge of the mystic that it seemed to
me that only confusion and misunderstanding could result
from applying the same word, knowledge, to the activities
of both scientist and mystic. I wanted to underline this
situation by putting knowledge in quotation marks, to
indicate that some clarification was necessary in the pro
posed usage. In anything that I have to say it is to be
understood that I am addressing myself to the situations
presented by the physical sciences unless the context indi
cates that other sorts of situations are contemplated. I
should also like to stress that what I have to say in the
following expresses only my personal attitude, and I have
no doubt that many physicists as well as philosophers will
disagree with much of it. It seems that physicists, when
they talk on matters with a philosophical tinge, are no
more likely to agree than the philosophers themselves.
A preliminary word is also desirable with regard to what
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I shall understand to be implied in the word nature in our
title. I shall not try to find the nature of the knowledge
of the physicist by asking what that knowledge is. In
general, whenever we ask what anything is we are inviting
confusion by throwing the doors open to all sorts of
philosophical issues about which there has been notorious
disagreement for the last three thousand years. It seems to
me that we shall do well to limit the scope of the discussion
as narrowly as we can, and apply the principle of Occam's
razor to strip away the unessentials. In particular, I want
to avoid the implication of the existence of knowledge in
the abstract, after the fashion of a Platonic idea, and reduce
the whole matter to as concrete terms as possible. I propose
merely to ask under what circumstances the word knowl
edge is used in connection with the activities of the physical
scientist. If I can find the answer I shall have all that I
need or can use in answering the question of what is the
"nature" of this knowledge.
It is to be noticed in the first place that the word knowl
edge is used very seldom by the physical scientist or the
physicist himself in describing what he does or in describ
ing his experience. Knowledge is a general word, most
commonly used by the outsider in describing what he
sees the physicist do, whereas the physicist himself is
mostly concerned with more specific situations for which
he has more special words. The directions in a labora
tory manual for elementary mechanics would, for ex
ample, never read, "Acquire a knowledge of the velocity
of the falling body after it has fallen one meter," but
would instead be, "Measure the velocity of the body
after it has fallen one meter." Neither would the phys
icist, in describing the result of his experiments with
falling bodies, say that he had acquired a "knowledge"
of the law of falling bodies; more probably he would say
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simply that he had found the law. The physicist is, never
theless, human, and he does on occasion use the language
of daily life; and in discussing his experiences he may well
say that he "knows" something or other. What does the
physicist have in the back of his head when he thus permits
himself to say that he "knows" this or that? There is, in
the first place, I believe, always the implication of truth.
If what the physicist "knows" is not true, then he does
not know it. Now truth does not proclaim itself, but has
to be established by some method; that is, it has to be
"verified." One of the functions of verification is to guard
against mistakes-illusions or faulty observation or faulty
memory or unjustified inferences as to fact. There is no
unique method of verification, but any operation may be
pressed into service which has any bearing, direct or in
direct, on assuring ourselves that the situation is as we
think it is. For the physical scientist, one of the most
effective methods of verification is repetition. If our
observation repeats, we presume that our original obser
vation was correct and that we may say that we are in
possession of legitimate knowledge. But this method is
applicable only in special contexts; that is, it is applicable
only to the type of situation that can be made to repeat
itself. Furthermore, there must be some way of being sure
that the conditions necessary for the repetition of the
situation have in fact been fulfilled. This latter usually
involves some sort of theoretical understanding on our
part.
Another powerful and widely used method of verifying
the correctness of our report of some situation is agreement
between our report and that of other observers. Physical
science concerns itself by preference with situations in
which verification by public report is possible. In fact,
verification by public report is so important in the physical
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sciences that sometimes it is incorporated into the very
definition, as when it is said that one of the conditions
that a body of so-called knowledge be scientific knowledge
is that it be publicly confirmable. This demand can
generally be met in the factual situations of physics, but
even here there are special situations in which public
observation or confirmation is impossible "in principle."
An example is afforded by situations in which the intensity
of the radiation with which the observations are made is
so low that we are dealing with individual photons. In
some of the nonfactual situations of physics the attribute
of publicity is even vaguer. However, in the "science" that
gets written in textbooks any generalization that ranks
as a "law" of physics has run the gauntlet of public accept
ance. But such public acceptance is only the consensus
of individual physicists, each of whom was individually
convinced of the validity of the law by activities essentially
private. In general, whenever one is concerned with a
scientific "proof," one is concerned with something essen
tially private. Even physics, therefore, cannot be com
pletely reduced to a public basis. In psychology, complete
reduction to a public basis is not possible even on the
factual level, for the behavioral psychologist is driven to
recognize the existence of phenomena "accessible only to
a single individual," as, for example, my toothache. If I
have a toothache I usually do not feel the necessity for
any sort of verification that I actually have it, so that it
might appear that here we have knowledge without the
necessity for verification; on the other hand, I usually
do not say, "I know that I have a toothache," but simply,
"I have a toothache." In situations as immediate as this
the whole concept of "knowledge" appears merely as a
verbal artifact, which may be dispensed with. But I cannot
say about you, "I know that you have a toothache," with-
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out attempting some sort of verification. And even in the
apparently most immediate case of my own toothache it
not infrequently happens that the dentist tells me that the
tooth I think is aching is not the one that really aches.
Verification in such cases has to be by some indirect
method.
Verification, whether more or less direct, is always of
the logical form, "Such and such may possibly be the case
because this and that is the case," but never of the logical
form, "Such and such is certainly the case because this and
that is the case." These situations are usually dealt with
on a probability basis, and there always seems to be a
factor of probability in any actual verification. For this
reason no knowledge can be certain. For another reason
no knowledge can be certain, for knowledge is an aspect
of our activity and as such can never avoid the specter of
self-doubt. There is no adequate answer to the questions,
"How do I know that I am not now dreaming?" or "How
do I know that I have not suddenly gone insane?" All
intellectual functioning is subject to the fundamental and
unprovable assumption that our intellectual integrity is
preserved.
For these various reasons it is not uncommon to hear it
said, "All knowledge is really only probable knowledge."
We may, if we like, speak of knowledge in this way; but
if we do we have to be careful, for the implication is close
to the surface that somewhere there is such a thing as
certain knowledge but that for some adventitious reason
we are not able to acquire it. There is no such thing-it
is of the nature of knowledge to be uncertain. In spite
of all this, it is not knowledge either unless there is some
operation for checking or for verification.
Assuming now that the physical scientist has accom
plished his verification, making his operations as direct
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.as the circumstances permit, so that he 1s m a position
to say that he knows that some statement as to a factual
.situation or as to a general law is a "correct" statement,
what is the significance of his verification and of his knowl
edge? Why did he go to the trouble of making his verifi
cation? I think that he made the verification because he
wants to use his knowledge, and that the significance of
the verification is to be found in the range of circumstances
in which the knowledge can be used. He seldom, I think,
makes the verification because he has any interest in ac
quiring knowledge isolated from any context. Now the
range of circumstances opened for the application of
knowledge by any particular sort of verification depends
-0n the sort of verification it is and has to be determined
in general by experience. The estimation by any individual
.as to what is the range of permissible use of "knowledge"
that was obtained by any specific method of verification
will in general depend both on the past experience of the
individual and on his individual temperament. A large
part of the scientific experience of the human race has been
devoted to acquiring more effective estimates of the range
of valid application of the "knowledge" obtained by vari
ous methods of "verification." The range of fruitful appli
cation of the knowledge that the fever of one's son was
caused by the evil eye of his neighbor, a knowledge
verified by the statement of the witch doctor, is estimated
to be greater by the savage Hottentot than by his more
,experienced European contemporary. Verification by the
witch doctor is not esteemed by the European as a sign ifi
cant method of verification, but the European arrived at
this conviction only on the basis of an extensive past
experience. This is an extreme example, but there survive
in our own society individual differences of opinion about
the significance of various indirect methods of "verifying"

20

The Nature of Physical Knowledge

knowledge which have some resemblance to it.
Our discussion of the range of application of the knowl
edge corresponding to some specific method of verification
suggests at once the specific subtopic for this paper, namely,
"Can it (i.e., the knowledge of the physicist) be expected
to lead to a full understanding of reality?" It would be
easy to make this question the start of an interminable
discussion of the nature of reality, with no possibility of
agreement. I think, nevertheless, that there are some things
that can profitably be said without attempting any com
pletely general philosophical discussion. Perhaps even
more than for the word knowledge most physicists have a
temperamental aversion to the word reality. They avoid it
whenever they possibly can. There are, nevertheless, cer
tain things that the physicist does that have a connection
of sorts with some aspects of what I imagine to be the
philosophical concept of "reality." The physicist ascribes
a special significance to situations in which he can make
readings with instruments, and he might even reluctantly
consent to saying that the readings of his instruments
correspond to something "real." Those physicists who say
that the electric field at a point in apparently empty space
is "real" do so because if they go to the point in question
with an instrument the instrument gives a reading. Besides
concepts corresponding to something "real" in this instru
mental sense, the physicist also recognizes concepts which
he describes as conventions, but which might perhaps
alternatively be said to be concepts corresponding to noth
ing "real." For instance, there was a school of thought
which maintained that the "force" of Newton's laws of
motion was only a "convention" because there was only
a single definition for it, namely mass times acceleration.
Here the convention would disappear and "physical real
ity" enter if some second alternative and independent
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definition of force could be framed in terms of which it
would be possible to subject the statement "force equals
mass times acceleration" to an experimental check. In
general, when there are two independent methods of
getting to the terminus, the physicist thinks of the situation
in ways recalling the way in which apparently the philos
opher thinks of "reality."
Granting, now, that the physicist has conceptual ma
chinery recalling the philosopher's "reality," I think the
question of our topic can at once be answered, for the
physicist certainly does not expect that his knowledge will
ever lead to a full understanding of this "reality." His
reason, however, is special to him, and not at all what the
philosopher presumptively implies by the question. I think
the physicist emphatically would not say that his knowledge
presumptively will not lead to a full understanding of
reality, for the reason that there are other kinds of knowl
edge than the knowledge in which he deals. His reason
is based on his actual experience as a physicist and has
almost no recognizable philosophical component. For it
has been his universal experience that never has it been
possible to set bounds to the knowledge that can be ob
tained with instruments, but always the bounds of factual
knowledge can be pushed back, both in the direction of
the very small and in the direction of the very large, by
instrumental advances. The physicist at present sees no
indication that this process of continued expansion will
ever stop, although he may believe that further progress
may become increasingly difficult. Furthermore, the phys
icist sees no present possibility, and anticipates no possi
bility in the future, that it will be possible to penetrate
into this new territory by any other methods than an
extension of those he already uses. The method of the
witch doctor is ruled out in his thinking.
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The development of quantum theory has, I think�
materially altered the physicist's conception of the nature
of his "knowledge" and the sort of hold this knowledge
enables him to gain on whatever may be meant by "real
ity." For he has learned that the object of knowledge is
not to be separated from the instrument of knowledge.
We can no longer think of the object of knowledge as
constituting a reality which is revealed to us by the instru
ment of knowledge, but the two together, object and
instrument, constitute a whole so intimately knit that it
is meaningless to talk of object and instrument separately.
This insight is deepened by developments on the outskirts
of what is traditionally considered to be physics, develop
ments such as the construction of complicated computing
machines and the advances in our understanding of brain
structure and function. It now appears that the instrument
of knowledge par excellence is the brain, and that the
nature of the brain determines and limits any possible
"knowledge." Furthermore, I believe it to be the temper
of the times to regard this as the whole story: given a
complete description in atomic terms of the constitution
of the brain (perhaps expanded to include the whole
nervous system), nothing more is needed, but everything,
including all the immediate data of introspection, will
be found somewhere concealed in the functioning of this
inconceivably complicated system. Some modification in
this formulation will doubtless be necessary to include
quantum phenomena, but it seems to be the present
thought that any such modifications will not obscure the
expectation that as complete a description as possible in
physical terms will tell the whole story. This attitude is
not capable of any rigorous justification, but it is not for
that reason to be characterized in terms of "belief" or
"faith." The attitude is rather to be described in terms of
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a program for action. The physiologist or the psychologist
regards as the most promising program for the immediate
future one in which attention is given to determining
everything implied in the detailed atomic structure of
the brain. There is no present indication that this program
is not capable of being carried out in principle. Neither is
there any other sort of program that in the light of past
experience offers any present prospect of success.
Given now that the brain is the ultimate instrument of
knowledge, a limitation at once appears on any possible
sort of contact which such an instrument can make with
any so-called reality. For it is perfectly obvious that it is
impossible that there should be a unique one-to-one corre
spondence between what happens in the brain and the
aggregate of things that happen outside it. A sufficient
reason is the numerical discrepancy between the number
of things that can happen inside the brain and the number
that can happen outside it. If "reality" is taken to include
all the things that happen outside the brain, it is so obvious
that the brain is incapable of even a full description of
reality, to say nothing of understanding it, that I think
a physical scientist would not think it worth his while
even to bother to make the point. Instead, it becomes a
pressing problem to understand how the brain is at all
capable of dealing even moderately effectively with the
complication outside it. Whatever its method, it would
seem that the brain must be forced to ignore most of what
is outside it and practice some method of selection. There
can be no question of any similarity or resemblance be
tween what the brain does and what provides the subject
of its activity. In fact, the concept of "resemblance" or
"similarity" is meaningless in this connection. The situ
ation is admittedly highly unsatisfactory; it is even difficult
to talk about it self-consistently. But in spite of this I
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think that the physical scientist is convinced there is no
other way. The brain provides the only conceivable instru
ment of knowledge, and any plausible programs of action
have to be drawn with this in view, and with the clear
recognition that there are many unsolved problems here.

2
Is "Physical Knowledge" Limited by Its
Quantitative Approach to Reality?
FRANK J.

COLLI NGWO OD

MY INTENTION is to approach the subject under
consideration, namely, physical knowledge, or, as I would
prefer to express it, the knowledge obtained as a result of
the investigations of the physical sciences, from what is
usually called a historical point of view. But it is not that
point of view in the pejorative sense of a mere recounting
of events fairly well fixed in space and time. Rather, I wish
to examine the reasoning involved in the distinction be
tween the mathematical sciences, the mathematicophysical
sciences, and the philosophic sciences aimed at understand
ing whatever there is that is knowable about material being.
To carry out that intention one should start with those
who first set down the distinction, because one can then
not only see their reasoning on the matter but also under
stand the later developments in the light of that of which
they were developments.
Thus, where to begin in this most important and most
complicated business of truth and certitude in our knowl
edge of physical being is not really a matter of choice. One
25
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must begin at the beginning, the philosophic and scientific
beginning when men first reflected in an intelligent manner
upon what they were doing, and why. No one knows the
absolutely first beginning of speculative thought, but we
have discovered the period when the philosophers of our
Western culture first set down what they thought and won
the approval of their peers. Unless we start with them, the
whole attempt to say something coherent, acceptable, and
true runs the risk of being invalidated by a prior knowl
edge, easily available to us, but of which we are ignorant.
It has often happened that a truly fine analysis of a subject
matter has fallen into desuetude because of a lack of
intelligent appreciation only to be rediscovered centuries
later as though it were being discovered for the first time.
For example, Descartes, in stumbling upon the notion of
a purely mathematical science of material being, did not
realize that the same notion had been thoroughly discussed
in ancient Athens and had been beautifully implemented
by ingenious Greek scientists, who were not unaware of
the limitations of such an approach to reality. There is
no instance of any one of them claiming that the mathe
maticophysical approach to reality is the only one.
As far as we know, from the best records that we possess
of the early history of Western civilization, the first kind
of knowledge that was esteemed for its exactness and
correctness was mathematical knowledge. The notion of
demonstrating the truth of some statement by a reasoning
process is seldom mentioned in the remnants of the civili
zations preceding the seventh century B.C., which saw the
advent of Greek philosophy and mathematics. The highest
period of development of Egyptian civilization produced
a rather poor mathematics, poor because it was not devel
oped as a knowledge independent of things but only as
a practical knowledge, and especially poor because the
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notation was as cumbersome as that of the later Roman
numerals. During the same early period of the history of
Western culture, the Babylonian civilization of the Sume
rian peoples developed the sexagesimal mathematics that
we still use in our conventional measurement of time and
in trigonometry. That civilization also produced profuse
and valuable recordings of an astronomical nature. When
Claudius Ptolemy produced his Syntaxis Mathematica,
commonly called the Almagest, around A.D. 150, his efforts
superseded all previous attempts to draw up reliable and
complete astronomical tables because of the incorporation
of this large group of Babylonian observations which were
remarkably accurate for the time in which they were made.
The Babylonians also had a rudimentary algebra which
was quite innocent of any desire to prove the formulas
which had been taken from a plane geometry and alge
braicized.
But no thoroughgoing explanation of the varieties of
knowledge is to be found in the Egyptian and Babylonian
civilizations from which the pre-Socratic philosophers,
especially Pythagoras, inherited so much. However, there
were these mathematical and astronomical treasures for
the taking. Pythagoras helped himself to them and became,
to use Aristotle's phrase, the founder of mathematical
philosophy. His followers cultivated the mathematical
heritage received from Babylonia, and in the heat of the
speculative enthusiasm peculiar to the fourth through the
second century B.C., they not only developed this heritage
tremendously but spared no effort to render mathematics
strictly scientific by giving proofs and by isolating the
postulates and axioms. But the early Pythagoreans placed
a peculiar stricture upon their approach to mathematics.
It is true that above all they wanted to know the reason
for the correctness that mathematics gave to their calcu-
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lations. But at the same time they held firmly to the notion
that mathematics was a science of whole quantities. I
interpret this to mean they thought that their mathematics
was a science of the quantity of things. The axioms and
postulates of Euclidean geometry lend force to this inter
pretation.1 For this reason they would not permit them
selves to talk of multiplying a length by a length because
such a physical action is impossible, nor would they use
numbers or symbols raised above the third power, because,
to their observations, only three dimensions were evident
in things and to use numbers raised to the fourth or fifth
power was to be talking about no thing (nothing).
The later Pythagoreans, Archimedes, for example, had
no qualms about using algebra as an algebra, irrespective
of whether the things being analyzed could in fact be
multiplied by themselves or divided by another, or not.
The reason they felt this way, I presume, is that they saw
mathematics as a science of something other than material
things, although it was most useful in the mechanical
science of the time. Archimedes, in trying to estimate the
area under a curve, by seeking to exhaust the area through
dividing it into rectangles of known area, developed a
notion of the infinitesimal and of how to calculate with
it that predated by roughly twenty centuries the develop
ment of the infinitesimal calculus by Leibnitz and Newton.
He could hardly have reasoned so brilliantly unless he
were quite sure that mathematics was primarily a knowl
edge of quantity abstracted from all the limiting charac
teristics of actual material quantities. He shows no
awareness of the strictures placed upon the Babylonian
mathematical heritage by the earliest Pythagoreans.
Thus a distinct transition, in the estimation of what
mathematics is, occurred between the time of Pythagoras
and the time of Archimedes. That period of transition con-
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tains within it the lifetimes of Plato and Aristotle, which
is quite sufficient to make it noteworthy; but it is also the
period in which the discovery of the irrational, the square
root of 2, for example, demanded some thought as to just
what mathematics is and as to how it differs from other
knowledge. Plato and Aristotle appear, in my opinion,
to be located in the period when the transition was occur
ring from considering mathematics as a science of things
to considering mathematics as a science of abstractions
only. This being so, Aristotle had the advantage of knowing
both views and of making his choice between them. That
choice and its relevance will be explained in a moment.
First, let us consider Aristotle's illustrious teacher and his
estimation both of mathematics and of the nature of reality.
Plato held that the mathematical sciences, although they
proceed with rigor and have some certainty on that ac
count, nevertheless are based upon hypotheses, and for
that reason lack apodictic certainty. The examples that
Plato gives of these hypotheses include the odd and the
even, the various figures, and angles. ·what he called
hypotheses, then, are the postulates that the odd and the
even exist, and that the figures and angles can be con
structed. Proof in mathematics, for Plato, means that,
given some statements, others may be logically deduced
from them; for example (my own example), given that
there are triangular figures, the property of the contained
angles equaling two right angles can be deduced by the
aid of a construction.
There is no appearance of hesitation on Plato's part in
making the mathematicals ideal entities: "And do you
know also that although they [the mathematicians] make
use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are
thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they re
semble, not of the figures which they draw, but oE the
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absolute square and the absolute diameter." 2 Mathematics
is not a science of existing material things, for Plato.
Nevertheless, in recommending its study he gives two rea
sons for its importance. One reason is that the study of
mathematics draws our attention to the realm of the
intelligible and fits the intellect for the journey into the
realm of the pure intelligibles, the realm of absolute
certitudes.3 The other reason is a practical one, namely,
that mathematics, although it is not a science of sensible
things, is nevertheless most useful in analyzing the universe
about us.
The practical usefulness of mathematics is lauded in
many dialogues, the Philebus, the Epinomis, the Laws, the
Republic, the Timaeus. In the Republic, mathematical
knowledge is depicted as being a requisite for the soldier
in the ordering of his troops, and as enabling the musician
to successfully construct in numbers the harmonies that
are basic to music.4 In fact, it is employed by all arts and
sciences and forms of thought.5 Also in that dialogue,
Plato chides the astronomers for star-gazing when they
should be attending to the development of mathematical
equations that would be capable of accurately formulating
the path and motion of the planets.6 His point is that,
in spite of the endless flux of appearances in sensible
reality, sufficient stability can be brought into our manage
ment of practical things, by the measuring and ordering
that the use of number effects, to enable us to conduct our
practical affairs successfully.7 Furthermore, in the celestial
realm there is not the same degree of mutability that there
is in the sublunary sphere.8 As a result the heavenly bodies
appear to move in regular, orderly motions which will be
susceptible of description by mathematical constructions
and formulas.9
This doctrine, that mathematics can order and bring
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certainty into our everyday practical knowledge, and that
it will eventually bring certainty to our knowledge of the
motions of the heavenly bodies, strongly suggests that
sensible reality is in some degree mathematically consti
tuted. This second notion of,the utility of mathematics,
which depicts mathematical forms as the models, and even
as the constituents, of sensible being, is given in the
Timaeus. There air and water are seen as binding together
fire and earth in the same manner as the means in a
numerical proportion bind the extremes to each other. 10
And when the Maker forms the visible universe he does
so by constructing the four elementary bodies out of a
chaotic matter by means of the forms of two kinds of
triangle, the half-square and the half-isosceles.11 But that
out of which this material world is constructed is the
ultimate in disordered chaos and so is the least subjected
to intelligence and order. Even though the elementary
bodies are constructed of mathematical figures, they retain
much of the mutability characteristic of the primordial
source.12 How modern Plato's assessment of the mutability
of matter is! Change the mathematics involved, and the
whole account would be as timely as that of any contempo
rary book on the philosophy of science.
Naturally, knowledge in tenns of the elementary bodies
and of composites formed from them will be no more
than mere opinion. That is to say, for Plato, knowledge
in terms of the affections that sensible becoming (there is
no being, and therefore no intelligibility, in the sensible
realm precisely as sensible) gives rise to in our senses is
impossible. Opinion alone is possible concerning this
realm. Any proof or demonstration apart from the mathe
matical is out of the question here. There can be no know
ing of the substantial nature or of the properties of a
material thing. It is futile in Plato's philosophy to talk
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of any scientific knowledge through the causes of material
being. Consequently, the royal road to truth is not through
the investigation of sensory phenomena; that way leads
to doubt about even those things of which he at first
seemed so certain. 13 The royal road to truth for Plato is
in thought and through thought to the Good in itself. In
this ascent to the Good, it is mathematics in its pure fonn,
that is, considered apart from sensible things, that first
satisfies the intellect's avid desire for the intelligible and
thus serves as a steppingstone to the realm of pure in
telligibility, which is attained not by any deductive process
but by an act of vision on the part of the intellect. Once
this vision is attained, once the essential nature of reality
is discovered, then the material universe will be under
stood as it is derived from the spiritual universe. 14 This
goal, set out for attainment partly by speculation of a
mathematical kind and partly by pure intuition, did not
prove to be as appealing to posterity as it was to Plato.
I would not wish to overstate Plato's position on the use
of mathematics. Nowadays, when the utility of mathematics
as a practical science is beyond question, there is a temp
tation to look back to Plato and to see in him the person
who successfully championed the use of mathematics in
the elaboration of physical science. This is not exactly the
truth. What he praised was the study of mathematics as an
intellectual exercise and as a study which aided in obtain
ing the vision of the Good. Thus he championed each of
the four branches of mathematics, numbers, geometry
(plane), stereometry (solid geometry), and astronomy, in
the same manner; that is, while allowing that they were
indispensable in practical affairs, nevertheless he actually
praised them only inasmuch as they were helpful in obtain
ing knowledge of the Good.
One might more correctly credit Aristotle as being the
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man who championed the use of mathematics in the
elaboration of the sciences of things. He too considered
astronomy and harmonics, as well as the other sciences
universally recognized as mathematical, as being branches
of mathematics. But he also added optics and mechanics
to the list of the more physical branches of mathematics.
In these four areas of investigation the knowledge of the
proven fact is given by the mathematical astronomer or
optician or musician or physicist. By the use of mathe
matics such men give proof. In these subjects, "It is the
business of the empirical observers to know the fact, of
the mathematicians to know the proven fact; for the latter
are in possession of the demonstrations giving the causes,
and are often ignorant of the fact." 15 Aristotle probably
means, by the latter part of his statement, that they are
not aware of all the possibilities of using their mathematics
in the analysis of things. Thus, because natural bodies
contain points, lines, planes, and volumes, they manifest
quantitative aspects and so admit of treatment by mathe
matical theorems. Geometry knows only the abstract form
of the straight line, and this form has no existence in
itself. The straight is found in stones and wood and in all
bodily things, even in air; it cannot be isolated physically,
but only mentally. 'Whereas the geometer considers the
straight apart from things, the student of optics considers
straight lines in the air.16 Thus are the applied parts of
mathematics distinguished from the speculative parts.
As for speculative mathematics, the pursuit of the study
of the mathematicals in themselves, Aristotle explains
what Plato had left undiscussed. Plato had maintained that
the mathematician uses the visible forms in order to think
about the mathematicals. But his explanation of the origin
of the mathematicals is unsatisfactory. Aristotle holds that
the mathematician investigates abstractions. "For before
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beginning his investigation he strips off all the sensible
qualities, e.g., weight and lightness, hardness and its
contrary, and also heat and cold and the other sensible
contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and con
tinuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in
three dimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantita
tive and continuous, and does not consider them in any
other respect, and examines the relative positions of some
and the attributes of these, and the commensurabilities
and incommensurabilities of others, and the ratios of
others." 11
The abstractions are representations of the quantified
aspects of material things. In order that the purely quanti
tative aspects of such things may be grasped more clearly,
their other features are left out of consideration. Thus, by
abstraction, the features not relevant to quantity considered
in itself are left aside, and the remaining content of
cognition is then analyzed. Aristotle made no claim to
being a mathematician, and he made no contribution to
the development of Greek mathematics. Therefore in his
explanation of mathematical abstraction we are not sur
prised to find only the most elementary notions used as
examples. The basic notion of quantity is that of the
continuum, the extended-in-three-dimensions. By sub
traction (in thought only), a continuum in two dimensions,
and a continuum in one dimension only, are isolated.
The Greeks defined solids, plane surfaces, and lines in this
manner. The possible arrangements of these would in
clude all the figures of plane geometry. The commensura
bilities would yield whole numbers and proportions. Thus,
a smaller length taken three times would measure a greater
length. The two lengths are said to be commensurable
because they have a common measure.
Although these notions are very elementary they serve
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to indicate the nature of mathematical abstraction. Over
and above being the intellectual process that gives stability
in thought to the notion of continuum, abstraction is a
process of subtracting various quantitative aspects of that
conceived continuum. Consider for the moment only three
of those subtractions. Think of them quite apart from the
abstractive process necessary to attain to any object of sci
entific analysis. The first subtraction takes away all colors,
sounds, odors, etc. It leaves an utterly blank continuum
having only two characteristics, size and shape. The second
sub traction deletes the various aspects of size and shape.
In one case depth is omitted, in another width, in a third
length, leaving an absolutely featureless continuum, which
could not be imagined, but which could be thought of as
empty space. It would have to be defined as a mere possi
bility of extension.
The third subtraction leaves aside the characteristics of
quantity as it is found existing in actual quantified things.
It substitutes symbols that are appropriate for reasoning
about quanta that have a very indeterminate character.
These quanta are as near to pure potency as the mind can
conceive. With these symbols unknown quantities can be
reasoned about. For example, a ratio can represent the
comparison of a length to a length: one side of a table is
to another as 4 is to 3; or it can represent a comparison of
areas; or it can represent simply a ratio of numbers; or it
can represent a ratio of unknowns, a/b as b/c. Although
Aristotle did not carry his analysis beyond arithmetic to
the consideration of a purely symbolic science, he never
theless saw why mathematics was useful in ordering and
measuring and calculating about things. It is because the
abstractions are far more wieldy in thought than the
quanta are in actuality. Corresponding to the orders and
relations of quantities that exist in mathematical systems
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is the possibility of approximately the same orders and re
lations existing among actual quantities. It is not the pre
cision and exactness of mathematics that are chiefly
responsible for the practical usefulness of some of its parts.
Actual quantity is an attribute of matter, and it shares the
vaiaries and mutability of all material things. Therefore,
it cannot be measured and analyzed with the absolute pre
cision that is characteristic of mathematical analysis. There
is no such thing as an exact measurement of actual quan
tities; measurements are only as exact as our measuring
devices make them. A mathematical yard contains exactly
36 mathematical inches, but no such accuracy can be found
in measuring the lengths of a yard and its inches in actual
quantity. 18
So long as a mathematics treats of that which has some
basis in things, no matter how slight that basis may be, the
actual order in the mathematics may be sufficient to bring
to light the hidden order in the realm of quantity in sen
sible things. This is the factor in practical mathematics
that makes it successful. The agent in act in such cases is
the human intellect perfected by mathematical knowledge
and possessed of the incommunicable knack of seeing where
the possibility of application lies. 19
But, going beyond Aristotle's elementary teaching on
abstraction, why is it that mathematics is based upon hy
potheses? If one starts his investigation with sensibles, he
accepts them as given and then proceeds. He knows why
he starts there; it is because he has something given whose
being present he does not need to question. He does not
say, if there are sensibles then I define them as such and
such. The sensibles are, and their definitions are contained
in their very being. The problem of the investigator is to
analyze such being into its definitions which are either
speculative or operational depending on what the aim of
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the investigator is. But if one starts with symbols which
represent subtractions from natural things, which do not
mirror their qualities, nor their actual determinate shapes
or sizes, nor any of their powers or dispositions, the possi
bility of finding among such symbols an object of knowl
edge, as absolute and as independent of the thought of
man for its existence as is the sensible universe, is reduced
to the vanishing point. And mathematics is fundamentally
the art of manipulating symbols of this kind, whether they
be lines and surfaces, or the unknowns of algebraic systems,
or whatever. There is a minimal being remaining to the
symbol after the abstraction of all determinations so that
its nature is close to being a mere possibility. If one says,
let p stand for any instance of anything, and let q be in
some manner different from p; then it is evident that both
p and q are in the highest degree indeterminate. The
manipulator of the most abstract of these symbols has the
power to give an intelligible content to his symbols which
the symbols do not yet possess, actually, but which they
are capable of receiving. The restrictions upon this human
creator reflect only his purely human capabilities intel
lectually and his dependence upon the sensible universe
for meanings to be given to the symbols. His dependence
upon the sensible universe is reflected in this that he con
siders as valid operations with symbols, operations that he
sees in matter, or in his own mental acts apprehending the
material world. Thus addition and subtraction are opera
tions, for manipulating the quantities of things, and such
operations are allowed in the realm of symbols. The if.
then notion is based upon concomitances discovered in
nature; the notion of "function and variable," if it is really
different from the "if-then" notion, is based upon con
comitances discovered in the variable aspects of nature;
and so on for the remainder of the operations, disjunction
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and the like. The one exception that occurs to me is nega
tion, for its analogue is found not in nature, nor in appre
hension, but in judgment.
If this analysis, of what mathematics in its simplest form
is, be correct, then one would be very surprised indeed if
it started with anything other than hypotheses. One might
expect a purely formal science, such as abstract mathe
matics or symbolic logic, to be based upon the most certain
foundations, as this would seem to be consistent with its
abstractness from the realm of mutable matter and with
its formal clarity. But, upon investigation of the nature of
symbol itself, upon seeing its neutrality to intelligible
meaning before it is used, one clearly sees that any opera
tion performed and any meaning given to symbol will be
at the whim of the artificer who wishes to construct a mean
ing in symbols.
I have endeavored to show that the very nature of sym
bolic reasoning is such that it has to start with hypotheses
because of the abstraction from meaningfulness that is in
volved in obtaining the symbolic notion. But this does not
explain why the physical sciences too are based upon hy
potheses. It is not enough to say that they make use of
mathematics as an instrument and that the science suffers
from the imperfection of the instrument. This is true in
the sense that mathematics is an ideal science dealing with
straight lines, or curved if you prefer, plane and curved
surfaces, regular functions, and the like, which do not oc
cur in nature in the way in which they are defined. This
causes difficulty, but not anything insuperable to human
ingenuity. The basic difficulty in the attempt to find abso
lutely certain first principles in the physical sciences lies
in the starting point that must be adopted in the practical
investigation of sensible being. To have scientific certitude
one needs a knowledge of cause. In the physical sciences
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the search has been predominantly for material causes, the
ultimate constituents of things. Although there have been
efforts to formulate formal causes, the manner in which
the constituents are arranged and interrelated, they have
usually taken the form of laws of action. Perhaps formal
causes are inexpressible in any otheT way than by listing
physical properties and describing activities. Whatever the
case may be for formal causes, the pursuit of ultimate ma
terial causes has been unabated since the four-element
theory was laid to rest by the analysis of combustion. But
even today the ultimate material causes still elude us. As
a result, knowledge in terms of the basic material com
ponents of being is not yet possible. Therefore the attempt
to explain in terms of ultimate material causes is thwarted
by our failure so far to discern them. The only available
substitute for the desired proofs regarding the ultimate na
ture of physical reality is hypotheses about physical reality.
Thus the modern sciences of nature supplement their de
scriptions of the visible world with suppositions as to the
ultimate nature of both visible and invisible material be
ing.
The two obvious restrictions upon physical knowledge
as possessed by present-day sciences of matter are reliance
upon symbolic instruments in thinking about things and
the use of hypotheses in place of knowledge of the actual
ultimate material elements. Does it follow then that, if
there is this uncertainty about the facts of physical being,
the being· that we are most readily acquainted with, the
same uncertainty will necessarily be found in any other
knowledge that attempts a correct account of creation? To
rephrase my opening question: Is "physical knowledge,"
which is limited by its quantitative approach to reality, the
only knowledge of reality?
To answer the question I should like to present a brief
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analysis of Aristotle's account of both knowledge and real
ity. Knowledge on both the sensory and intellectual levels
is the production within our consciousness of a represen
tation of something. In the representation the thing is
"seen" under some aspect or other; for example, sight sees
it as being colored and shaped, and intellect goes beyond
this, seeing it as being a self-existent or an accident. It is
this process of "seeing" what is enduring among the
changeable aspects of things that enables one to obtain
something enduring in knowledge. 20 The something en
during in knowledge is information of what a thing is pri
marily, or for the most part. Such knowledge endures even
when that of which it is knowledge does not endure. For
conceptual knowledge to be true it does not have to con
form to the mode of reality possessed by that of which it
is knowledge. In fact, the kind of reality that is being con
sidered at a given moment, whether it be a thing apparent
to the senses, or a hypothesis, or an ideal such as a theory,
will be thought over and apprehended by the intellect
without there being necessarily any reference to the status
of the thing being known. This latter kind of knowledge,
of how what is being thought of exists, is attained by in
tellectual judgment. To understand the indeterminacy
principle, or the ergodic hypothesis, is not too difficult;
but to judge truthfully whether they are valid and to what
extent they are valid is another and more difficult matter,
requiring the decision in advance as to what criteria are to
be used in deciding what mode of existence is possessed by
an object known. The one criterion accepted by the lay
man is this: If the thing being thought of is one that I can
have sensory awareness of in my waking state, then it has
more to it than simply my thought of it; it is a thing. This
is the criterion used in everyday knowing. Unfortunately
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it will not work for Professor Bridgman; his remarks im
ply that he cannot tell whether he is awake or asleep.
Some things are evident, and some are not. When one is
fully conscious that he is seeing a colored thing, he takes
the coloredness of the thing to be evident to sight. He
never attempts to prove what is evident; only what is not
evident demands proof. Other things over and above sense
qualities are evident; for example, quantity and change
are two other fully discernible aspects of the universe. The
relation between the color seen, and that in things which
gives rise to it, is not evident and so provokes an invesfr
gation both of things and of sensing. Similarly, the con
nection between minimal quantity and the nature of a
material thing is not evident and requires investigation.
When such investigations turn up the truth of the matter,
the truth is called scientific. This truth, as was previously
mentioned, can be expressed in quantitative terms or it can
be expressed in nonquantitative terms. ·when it is expressed
in nonquantitative terms it lacks the approximative pre
cision and accuracy that the use of measurement gives, but
it is certainly true knowledge. If I pass light through a dif
fraction grating and attempt to measure the path of the
particle, or wave, that travels from the grating to a screen
behind it, undoubtedly I am dealing with measurables:
distance, frequency of light, and extent of fringes on the
screen. But the question as to the path of the individual
whatever-you-call-it of light is saved from being utterly
ridiculous only by the fact that I, and any other observer
who cares to, "see" light entering the grating and light ap
pearing on the screen. The unverifiable assumption that it
is the same light that strikes the grating and that strikes the
screen afterward causes me no greater concern than the
unverifiable assumption that the sunlight that caused my

42

The Nature of Physical Knowledge

sunburn is the same light that left the sun eight minutes
earlier.
Philosophers like Aristotle have been of the opinion that
it is better to start with what is evident, and from that
vantage point to proceed to investigate what is obscure.
The precision of an approximative measurement is not re
quired for such a procedure; nor are the assumptions that
there is gravitational force, and that the velocity of light is
constant, prerequisites to knowing that water flows down
to the oceans and that the sun warms things. Knowledge
of this latter kind is presupposed to all science of whatso
ever type, quantitative or nonquantitative. If absolute pre
.cision were a prerequisite for truth, only speculative
mathematics would be true. But speculative mathematics
is obviously based on assumptions (the use of natural num
bers, 2, 3, 4, etc., excepted). To hold that absolute pre
cision is the essential prerequisite for truth would put us
in the peculiar position of holding that man, who cannot
make a single thing (he can only rearrange what he finds),
<:an, in elaborating mathematical systems, make the only
truth there is.
All sciences, including the philosophy of science itself,
have had to avoid the exclusive use of merely quantitative
expressions in order to talk of qualities and activities which
.are more than the measurements that can be made of them.
I can, by using terms standing for qualities, quantities,
substances, etc., tell what mathematics is; but no mathe
matics can tell what it is. Nor can any mathematics tell
what a substance, or a quantity, or a quality, is. In fact, a
hasty induction from only ten books purporting to tell
what mathematics is (written by authors who understood
mathematics, I presume) left me with the opinion (not very
approximative, I am sure) that mathematicians, integrated
into one spokesman who resolved all their opinions, could
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not tell anyone what mathematics is. But enough of this
raillery. Mathematicians must know what they are talking
about; how else could they disagree?
Since mathematics, when used by physics, is only a
method and not an explanation, it can be dispensed with
to some extent when a true explanation is achieved. For
example, if force did exist as the cause of the orbits of the
solar planets, their orbital motions would be understood
in terms of it. Kepler's laws would add nothing to this
basic understanding. They would add something to the
knowledge of how the planets follow their orbital motions,
but would add nothing to the why. Speculative physical
science has very little need of mathematics in expressing
the qualitative and substantial nature of things. Mathe
matics is an instrument of analysis; it is not a constituent
of things. Only the perverse way of looking at things that
is characteristic of positivism could hold that an instru
ment of analysis is more real than what it analyzes. But no
one could possibly believe in positivism any morel
Aristotle held that knowledge of the quantitative, quali
tative, and activity differences of material things gives
knowledge of their forms. The essential form of a thing is
defined as that factor which determines the actuality of a
thing. It is not a sophism. It is a way of speaking that cor
responds with reality. For example, the reason why a tree
and a cat appear to be different to us is that the basic ele
ments of both are formed in a different manner. If you put
a portion of both through qualitative analysis you would
find carbon as a constituent of each. But it does not seem
reasonable to say that both the cat and the tree are carbon
compounds having inexplainable differences in appear
ance. It seemed reasonable to Aristotle to say, in the begin
ning, that, whatever the ultimate constituents of things
tum out to be, those things that appear to be radically
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different are formed differently. Thus, for him, the essen
tial form of a thing is that which accounts for a thing's
being the kind of thing that it is.
When a tree or a cat is reduced to its elementary parts,
there is no point in searching for the original form. The
act of killing and dissolving needed to get at the parts has
destroyed the organization characteristic of a whole tree
and a whole cat. Although no form is isolable this does not
mean that forms are mere devices to explain an organiza
tion of matter that we do not understand. We do not
understand this organization, but it is obvious that matter
is organized. The term form is used to indicate this fact,
and it is indispensable to both our everyday and our philo
sophic vocabulary. For sciences whose greatest concern is
the isolating of material causes, it can be dispensed with
in matters of analysis, but something like it, terms such as
"organic whole," "synthetic whole," have to be used to ex
press the togetherness of parts that is characteristic of actu
ally existing material things.
If human knowledge could grasp the essential form of
a thing it would understand all the characteristics of that
thing. Obviously no one can say of any material thing that
he understands it completely. Qualities and activities are
signs of the essential natures of things. To banish these
from discourse because some aspect of them is measurable
is to make thought easy at the expense of making it empty.
Although the reduction of qualities to quantity has often
been attempted and has often been claimed successful, the
simple fact of the matter is that no quantity can be known,
either directly or by instruments, without its being known
by means of qualities that have an effect upon our senses.
The universe is quantified, but that is not all that it is. It
exhibits qualities that are constant-the orange color of
copper, for example; and without these qualities, sense
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qualities, and the activities of material things, nothing
would be knowable. If the qualitative aspects of things by
which we know them are erroneous, then so much more
so are the quantitative aspects, for they are known only
through the senses which detect qualities primarily and
quantities only secondarily. If you deny the reality of qual
ity, you must deny the possibility of knowing objective
quantities.
To conclude, things are quantitative and qualitative and
substantial. A knowledge of things from one of these points
of view, the quantitative, requires the elimination of the
ordinary qualitative aspects, the color, the sound, etc., that
are associated with it. But to banish these from considera
tion in order to have a nice clear-cut precision, from the
purely quantitative point of view, is not to banish them
from reality. They will remain and will still inform us of
"what things are up to" after the present distress over the
upsetting effect to the latest physical theory is long for
gotten. Remember, a practical science, in order to be suc
cessful, does not need to know what things are; it only
needs to know what they are likely to do, or, failing that,
what we can do to them. But a speculative science, and the
philosophy of science and metaphysics are such, must have
reasonable certitude before it can progress; and in the
realm of matter such certitude is difficult to obtain. The
philosophy of science, it seems to me, must accept this ac
count of things, and, directing its attention to the kind of
thing that mathematics is and to the difficulty involved in
the analysis of matter, must attempt to get an over-all view
of the quantitative-investigation field and say something
intelligent about what is going on in it. It does not belong
to it to say anything about matters that are not clearly in
its domain, unless in talking about such matters it takes
full cognizance of the viewpoint by which they are to be
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properly apprehended. Everything involved in speech is
capable of being analyzed quantitatively except the way in
which its reception by hearing affects the intellect of the
hearer. No quantitative analysis can predict this effect, or
measure it, or explain it away. In the beginning there was
mind, and matter, and forms, in Aristotle's language; they
are still here challenging us to know them, more and more
fully, and forbidding us to exclude either matter or any
one of the various forms, quantitative, qualitative, etc.,
from a true account of things.

3
Does Physical "Knowledge" Require A Priori
or Undemonstrable Presuppositions?
HENRY MARGENAU*

I. The Logical Forms of Scientific Demonstration
To KNOW, as the title of my discourse requires,
what is meant by an undemonstrable proposition, it seems
necessary to achieve clarity and perhaps agreement with
respect to the meaning of "demonstration" in physics. The
word is used in a great variety of contexts. It denotes meth
ods of conviction or persuasion ranging all the way from
deductive mathematical proof to incidental exhibition of
specific items of evidence. Literally, it means "showdown,"
and its meaning centers in the presentation of crucial or
striking sensory confirmation of a proposition.
I shall first accept the wider sense of demonstration, al
lowing the word to stand for any experience that has a
large measure of suasive power or cogency relative to a
physical proposition, supposing, however, (a) that the ex
perience is of the direct or perceptory type (not merely the
• Aided by a grant from the National Science Foundation.
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recognition of logical or mathematical consistency) and (b)
that the proposition is sufficiently general to be called a
hypothesis or a law or a theory. Under these conditions
one encounters two large classes of demonstrations in a
science like physics. The first may be called inductive or,
better, correlational; the second, deductive or, for reasons
that will soon be given, exact.
Let Boyle's law be such a proposition. To demonstrate
it may mean making a very large number of measurements
of the pressure and the volume of a gas at a given tem
perature, showing that they all very nearly satisfy the law.
The logical situation here is this. The experimenter has
obtained n values for the pressure P, and n corresponding
values for the volume V. Except by an unwarrantable and
logically illicit extrapolation, these 2n experimental values
cannot establish the belief that in every possible measure
ment, past and future, P equals c/V. What they do imply
is that the correlation coefficient, k, of the P, with the c/V.
is very nearly 1, and this entails, via laws of induction
which are progressively being clarified,1 that future obser
vations will satisfy Boyle's law with a computable probabil
ity, a probability that is a function of both n and k.
Here then is the character of an inductive demonstra
tion: it changes n into n+l, increasing the probability in
question. The psychological force of an inductive demon
stration, however, is enormously greater than its logical
force. If a student to whom the law is a novelty sees a few
positive instances of the correlation between P and 1/V,
he is greatly impressed and takes the demonstration as final
proof in the same vein and with the same satisfaction as a
proof of Pythagoras' theorem. This is partly valid, for the
probability is raised from O to a value not far from 1 by
only two or three positive instances, whereas many further
confirmations cause it to crawl toward I very slowly; it is
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partly wrong, because the novice mistakes the element of
surprise for cogency.
For the more advanced student a demonstration of
Boyle's law requires a great deal more. He will think of the
law as implied by, or as a special case of, a more general
proposition called the perfect gas law, or as a consequence
of the equation of state for real gases, and he will see even
this in the framework of the more embracive kinetic theory
or statistical mechanics. Having already confronted situa
tions which led him to accept the validity of the laws of
particle mechanics, and regarding the passage from particle
mechanics to statistical mechanics as a simple and reason
able one, he thinks of the analytic consequences of that
theory as true, and his a priori expectation, when con
firmed by a very small number of positive instances sup
porting Boyle's law, engenders in him an assurance
concerning the outcome of future experiments that is far
beyond justification by the inductive probabilities just
mentioned. The point is that the coherence of the logical
texture in which the proposition to be tested is embedded
produces its own evidence, and this evidence makes reli
ance on correlations less severe and less important. Never,
of course, does a physicist dispense with empirical con
firmation, nor can a theory create empirical data out of
purely rational ingredients-Eddington was, in my opinion,
quite wrong methodologically when he suggested that the
constants of nature are reflections of tautological human
procedures. What the physicist entertains here is healthy
respect for the positive feedback that takes place between
purely inductive evidence and the a priori expectation
that flows from the logical entailment of a given statement
by more general propositions already confirmed. In prac
tice, he couples correlational demonstration with deductive
demonstration. A science that has attained success and

50

The Nature of Physical Knowledge

stability between these procedures is called exact, and for
this reason I have labeled the deductive method itself ex
act. Let us study it more carefully.
Its use amounts to what is ordinarily called an explana
tion, a feat which is characteristic of the deductive process
and has no meaning in any correlational pursuit. Explana
tion starts with some very general affirmation, such as is
contained, for example, in Newton's laws together with
the ergodic hypothesis. Let me call this set of premises So.
They alone do not imply Boyle's law. Hence, one intro
duces a set of further assumptions of a less general sort
concerning which there is some empirical evidence. They
may include the supposition that the forces acting between
individual molecules are additive, or central, or indeed
zero. These suppositions will be called S1. From the con
junction of S0 and S1, theorems T1, T2 • • • can be derived
by logical procedures; among these theorems are the gen
eral gas law and its special case, Boyle's law. But as a the
orem the statement is still indefinite and empty, for it
merely contains the symbols P and V whose reference to
observation needs to be inserted. It is at this place that
operational definitions 2 enter, and by their intervention
empirical manipulations can engage the symbols in con
crete fashion, leading to a climax which logicians call con
firmation or disconfirmation.
In symbols: So· S1 :::> (T1, T2, T3 · · ·)
One of these theorems, say T,, functionally relates P and V.
P and Vin turn are connected to numerical values P' and
V' by rules of correspondence 3 of which operational defi
nitions are a special and important class. If P' and V' are
found in observation, Ti is said to be demonstrated and to
be true (with certain reservations). And if all T, are con
firmed, preferably many times and by numerous observers�
So and S1 are demonstrated.
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Some may feel that the word demonstrate in this connec
tion is ill chosen. I confess to some sympathy with this sen
timent, because the manner in which the S's are verified is
rather indirect and lacks the "ad oculos" quality expected
of demonstrations. Nevertheless, no more direct way to
ascertain the truth of abstract propositions is available, and
if the word demonstrate is to have any significance at all
with respect to such general principles as the basic laws of
mechanics, of thermodynamics, or the ergodic hypothesis,
which enter into our example, it must reside in the transi
tion from S to P' and V' which has been sketched.
Accepting this meaning of demonstration, we ask what
measure of certainty it confers upon S0 or, to be more spe
cific, upon So · S1• In common language, So • Si, henceforth
simply written as S, is called the explanation of, or the
reason for, Boyle's law. Every explanation in science is an
act of logical inclusion-a chain of reasoning that allows a
particular proposition known as a fact to be seen as the
consequence of a more inclusive set of propositions. There
is often a series of explanations, as in the case of gravita
tional motion, where a "fact," like the fall of a stone, is ex
plained by Galileo's "law" of constant acceleration; this
itself can be explained in terms of Newton's law of uni
versal gravitation, and this, once more, as a special case of
Einstein's law of gravitation. Here we have to stop, for at
the present stage of physics there is no more general theory
which yields Einstein's (or some other, perhaps more suc
cessful) formulation of general relativity as a deductive
consequence. A proposition forming the logical starting
point of an explanatory chain is called a postulate or, as a
carryover from the days when first principles were regarded
as indubitable, an axiom. In our example of Boyle's law
the chain has but a single link; at least, one may think of
it in that way. Strictly speaking, the number of links is not
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countable: as in all deductive situations, one can interpose
between first premise and final conclusion an arbitrary
number of intermediate though usually uninteresting
steps. Here, for simplicity, we shall regard the passage from
S (basic principles) to T (Boyle's law) as one.
The demonstration in question has this form:
S :J T
T

:.s

Every student of elementary logic will at once recognize
in this conclusion the famous form of the fallacy of the
consequent. One is really not entitled to affirm S if its con
sequent, T, is true. The physicist knows this, too, for he is
aware of the circumstance that Boyle's law may very well
be also the consequent of postulates quite different from
S, perhaps not yet discovered.
The history of science is full of instances where accepted
implication relations of the form S :J T though still valid
have been abandoned as part of science. This may happen
for several reasons, among them the following. Sometimes,
. later, more refined experiments prove a given consequence
of S, T, false. In this case S usually has to be changed. This
change is uninteresting from my present point of view, for
it could have been effected even if the reverse relations
were true, i.e., if T implied S. The usual case, however, is
this. Further experimentation shows that T remains true,
but new observations become possible, observations ex
pressible, let us say, in the form of a different theorem T'.
Now T and T' are quite compatible since they deal with
different sorts of phenomena, but T' is usually not implied
by S. If the relation S :J T were reversible, so that T ::J S
and T' :J S', S and S' would contradict each other, and we
should be developing a kind of physics in which each set
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of phenomena must be explained by its own set of theories,
simplicity and cohesion being lost. It is the irreversibility
of the implication relation, S ::J T, that saves the day; for
T and T' can both be implied by a different and wider set
of postulates. That irreversibility, however, forces science
to affirm the consequent.
Hence follows the important methodological result that
physics can never be certain of its postulates. This is the
price it pays for its dynamism, for its facility of self-correc
tion, for its impressive rate of growth. And as for deductive
demonstration, we see that it, too, can never reach certainty
of its premises.
Yet the lack of certainty encountered here is altogether
different from that which afflicts correlational demonstra
tions. They could be expressed in terms of probabilities.
By probability the physicist means a relative frequency in
some well-defined ensemble. Such an ensemble is available
when Boyle's law is tested empirically: one can clearly
specify and observe the relative frequency of volume meas
urements falling into a range about Vi when the pressure
has a value in the neighborhood of Pi. But what about the
relative frequency of a theory (postulate, hypothesis) S?
It seems to me, in view of the practice of scientists and
in view of the logical situation just discussed, that a search
for a "probability index" of theories is unprofitable. We
do not speak of theories and postulates as probable or im
probable, but as correct or incorrect relative to a given
state of scientific knowledge, or perhaps as approximations
to a more exacting theory, either known or not yet known.
In applications of a theory we make allowance not for
probabilities of hypotheses but for errors of numerical re
sults. There is no ensemble of theories in which favorable
and unfavorable ones can be counted, and this is because
theories, like ideas, are not subject to arithmetic; two the-
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ories may be one, or many, or indeed none if they are con
tradictory. Hence we conclude: Inductive or correlational
demonstration involves uncertainties capable of numerical
test as probabilities. Deductive demonstration of theories
involves a different, intrinsically logical kind of uncer
tainty which arises from the inevitable fallacy of the con
sequent inherent in it. To distinguish them, let us use the
names inductive and deductive uncertainty.
2. Meta-Principles of Science

Deductive uncertainty means radical freedom of choice
in the construction of hypotheses. For, while a given finite
set of empirical data (e.g., P{ and T{) allows the calcula
tion of a most probable or "true" set of values for these
quantities, no similar unique method for specifying a
"true" hypothesis or a most probable hypothesis in the face
of the data (P/ and Tl) exists. The absence of uniqueness
is especially serious for the kind of terminal hypotheses
called postulates, and it arises quite clearly from the pres
ence of "fallacies of the consequent" in the chain of entail
ments connecting postulates with observations.
The agreement among scientists with respect to accept
able explanations remains therefore an astonishing histor
ical fact so long as only logical concerns are allowed to
govern our inquiry. When the view is shifted to the actual
practice of physicists, however, a new and highly revealing
element emerges: the deductive uncertainty is held in
bounds by important habits of reasoning, by pre-empirical
commitments to certain forms of theory-in short, by fac
tors not imposed and frequently not even suggested by the
facts themselves. Philosophers have spoken of them as cate
gories of thought, as razors that shear away irrelevancies of
explanation, and as injunctions enforced by a lumen nat-
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urale or by divine revelation; physicists have used phrases
like economy of thought, simplicity, and elegance of ex
planation, in describing them. Whatever the name, their
analysis is of importance at every stage of science. In today's
physics they clamor for attention with greater vehemence
than ever because a major point of controversy, the so
called causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, in
volves precisely these items of transempirical commitment;
to seek the solution of this problem in the field of data and
of detailed mathematical analysis, as is sometimes done,
must be recognized as a misguided and futile endeavor.
In a traditional sense of the word metaphysical, the para
logical, nonempirical principles affecting the choice of
hypotheses should be called metaphysical. To avoid mis
understanding, may I say that I do not include in that word
the ontological suffusion of absoluteness which it some
times carries, or the self-assurance made notorious by think
ers of Deussen's 4 school; my precedence lies in the usage
of principled philosophers like Kant, to whom metaphysics
meant (in part, at least) the theory of scientific knowledge
with its primary task of elucidating the way in which such
knowledge is made acceptable and objective. And by non
empirical I simply mean procedures that have a character
apart from the coerciveness of observational experience,
even though they have no business and no significance
without such experience.
An extended survey of the metaphysical principles has
been conducted elsewhere.3 Terms like logical fecundity,
extensibility of constructs, the requirement of multiple
connections among constructs, their permanence, causality,
simplicity, and conceptual elegance were employed to sug
gest a spectrum of functions which these requirements per
form. To my knowledge a complete logical analysis of this
vague assemblage has not been made, nor is it certain that

56

The Nature of Physical Knowledge

it would be fruitful or that it could be achieved. There is
perhaps an advantage in the restraint which leaves- these
principles unanalyzed, for any complete logical structure,
once established, produces a stability, a rigor often close
to stagnancy, and the principles under consideration, if
viable, are in flux.
This last admission shows at once an insufficiency of the
Kantian doctrine, upon which the present study leans. For
Kant, the categories, which may be regarded as the fore
runners of the metaphysical principles under inspection
here, were eternal forms of thought, wholly of a priori
origin. The history of physics since his day belies this al
legation; it shows that the principles are pragmatic devices
of great scope, established by an impressive crescendo of
scientific successes but never exempt from careful scrutiny
and modification or, indeed, rejection. We have seen what
has happened to causality in our time, and nobody can
guarantee the quality of simplicity in theories dealing with
nuclear forces, although we still hope for it. Despite this
concession of mortality, however, one cannot fail to be
astonished by the longevity of metaphysical principles:
. their lives are reckoned in millennia, whereas physical the
ories nowadays live decades, and facts may die in months.
Suffice it here to show briefly how the principles in
question 5 operate on the contemporary stage of physics.
As our first example, we choose the history of the neutrino.
It started out as a metaphysical gleam in Pauli's eye, spring
ing from the hope that the constructs of nuclear theory,
in particular of beta emission, might prove consistent
(logically fertile) and extensible. But questions arose: Is
the neutrino an insular construct, or is it multiply con
nected? In particular, are there rules of correspondence
which give it empirical status beyond the demand for
consistency in the face of conservation of energy and mo-
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mentum? The issue here was not one of direct sensory
confirmation, which was ruled out by the very qualities
assigned to the neutrino itself; nobody expected the parti
cle to be seen or to manifest itself in cloud chambers.
Physicists felt uneasy because there were not enough
connections between the postulated entity and other con
structs, connections which would make a difference in the
empirical domain. The principle of multiple connections
has now been satisfied, even though the neutrino has not
been seen directly.
The negative proton was expected on other grounds:
it had to exist if nature is symmetric. Here an esthetic
requirement enters the scene, something, perhaps, that
comes under the heading of elegance. In a way it contra
dicts simplicity and shows that different principles some
times compete in application. The force of the symmetry
postulate was great, inducing theorists to incorporate the
negative proton in their calculations and to predict how
it might manifest itself in experiments, all according to
the pattern S :) T with appropriate elaboration. The meta
physical principles generated S; empirical verification
established T.
These brief allusions, which can hardly portray ade
quately, or do justice to, the interesting play of metaphysi
cal principles on the scene of present physics, must suffice
here. Some of the most fascinating problems arise because
we defy positivism and believe in them; otherwise we
should not be worried about negative matter, geons,
chronons, hodons, or, for that matter, the elusive plasma
oscillations.
We have said that metaphysical principles often suggest
general laws S; empirical verification then establishes a T
which is implied by S. This is the pattern of many dis
coveries, and it stands in sharp contrast to the accidental or
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shotgun method of science which probes the facts in
assiduous and never-tiring fashion with the hope that new
discoveries, unrelated to present theory, will suggest new
understanding. Actually, science is a two-way transaction
which flourishes when equal emphasis is placed on both
approaches. \Ve are perhaps in danger today of over
stressing the shotgun attack, chiefly because ideas promot
ing elegance in theory are rare and money for research
that turns up stones to see what is under them is plentiful.
But to return from a digression. Our examples indicate
that metaphysical principles are as important today as they
have been throughout the history of physical science.
However, they never act in isolation. As has been more
carefully set forth 8 elsewhere, after constructs are selected
in accordance with metaphysical requirements, they are
then tested by an establishment of "circuits of empirical
verification," and only those constructs are retained as
valid, i.e., as verifacts, which are embedded in a network
of successful circuits. It is the neglect of this verifying phase
of scientific method that accounts for the pathology of
. Deussen's metaphysics.
Our journey into the territory of scientific method has
now brought us to an elevation from which the subject of
this article takes on added interest, or at least added com
plexity. Should we count the metaphysical principles as
undemonstrable presuppositions? Are they a priori? Does
physical knowledge truly require them? The last question
I should now affirm definitely, and offer in evidence the
preceding excerpts from recent physics, in addition to un
countable examples of the past. The other two questions
can hardly be settled so easily, because they are subject to
different possible interpretations, and we must return to
them. First, however, it is well to deal with some challenges
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and afterthoughts that have come up in connection with
the list of metaphysical principles as published.3
Professor Frank 6 suggests that scientific method is highly
sensitive to cultural and social factors, and presumably he
would accord to them a rank comparable with causality,
simplicity, and so forth. Hence we should inquire whether
our list needs to be enlarged, and whether it should not
contain, besides the present socially neutral items, certain
factors linking the basic procedures of science with the
structure of society or even the political system in which
science is practiced.
Then there is another point that should be discussed.
To be objective and generally acceptable, it is often
claimed, scientific truth may not be private truth. It must
be public, inasmuch as every normal person with adequate
training can acquire that truth. This view equates objec
tivity with intersubjectivity and insists on communality
of demonstration. Again, one may ask whether here is
not an important principle to be added to our earlier list.
The next section is devoted to these matters. Section 4
deals with an allied problem, posed by the growing insist
ence with which some physicists demand the resolution of
quantum-mechanical probabilities into mechanistic arti
facts, or hidden variables, and the like. The interest that
attaches to this last "principle" justifies our treating it in
a section by itself, although its status is not different from
that of the others.

3. Compatibility with Cultural Norms and Communality
of Evidence as Controlling Factors of Physical Know
ledge
It is impossible to deny that moral and political con
siderations affect the course of science, and Frank offers
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a number of examples to prove the point. Our own time
presents ample evidence for it. Hence the occurrence of
such influences need not be argued and cannot be ques
tioned. What matters here, however, is whether a patent
historical connection between morals, religion, and politics
on the one hand, and the methods employed by science on
the other, justify the inclusion of a requirement of compat
ibility with cultural norms among the regulative principles
of science, coordinate with logical fertility, simplicity,
causality, and so forth. Do we in fact rely on our condition
ing by the cultural milieu in the same way as we rely on
simplicity of explanation?
First, let it be admitted that cultural conditioning,
while present, is also inescapable. It is a commonplace.
One cannot think thoughts, scientific or otherwise, for
which training has not prepared one. Language determines
in large measure our forms of reasoning, and it may well
be that principles like causality, which operate with states
and systems that are doubtless descendants of Aristotle's
attributes and substances, are historical consequences of
the subject-predicate relation dominating ludo-European
- speech. The influence of political systems, though less
direct and affecting mostly the rate of growth of science,
is likewise inevitable, since what can destroy life can also
destroy science. And here we approach the main issue. Is
cultural conditioning to be compared with the metaphysi
cal principles we have listed, or does it belong in the same
class with other commonplace factors that also affect
science, like the training we receive, the language we
speak, the friends we have, and the food we eat?
I should class it among the latter and therefore refuse
moral and political considerations an acknowledged regu
lative role in the formation of scientific postulates and
hypotheses. To some extent, this is shutting one's eyes to
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reality in the hope of keeping science clean. But there are
cogent reasons in favor of this stand. For even those who
practice political, religious, or moral disciplining of science
deny that they are doing it; they still insist that they base
their reasoning on "objective" grounds. Moreover, the
accounts that inform us of the incidence and the inevita
bility of such moral-political mortgaging of truth them
selves never fail to convey a measure of condemnation of
this very circumstance, thus showing that a distinction
between good and bad regulative principles is fairly
universal. Finally, and this is the most interesting and the
most telling point, history somehow exposes instances in
which scientific theory has been influenced by nonscientific
considerations and proves them wrong, ill-conceived, or
diversionary; science heals the flaws that political con
ditioning sometimes leaves in the wake of its advance.
For all these reasons, it would seem that affinity of science
with culture cannot be demanded as a metaphysical prin
ciple commensurate with the others.
The story is different with respect to communality or
intersubjectivity as a controlling factor of scientific method.
Here we encounter a requirement which is wholly opera
tive and acceptable, and which might indeed be added to
our former list. It was omitted because, I feel, it follows
from the others.
Science is certainly an intersubjective, a communal
affair, so far as that is possible. Every experience, if it is
to be relevant, must be sharable or communicable; isolated
experiences, if they can be repeated, do not count. Some
isolated experiences, however, cannot be repeated. Astro
nomical observations of the past, a measurement of the
velocity of light in 1910, are admitted as scientific evidence
when cosmological theories perhaps involving a variable
velocity of light are to be tested. It is seen, therefore, that
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repeatability by other persons is a kind of secondary re
quirement which is sometimes waived. Dependence cm the
testimony of others can be contradicted by the equally
scientific attitude of individuals who will accept no evi
dence save their own. And there have been mass halluci
nations.
Nevertheless, scientific knowledge attains its stability
by relying on the experiences of many. But this, it seems
to me, must be regarded as a special consequence of the
more basic requirements of logical fertility and multiple
connections, already cited. For a construct that is not
communicable, or one that is communicated but not
believed, is clearly sterile. Hence the requirement that
scientific constructs should be logically fertile, coupled
with the fact that there are other people, at once implies
communality of knowledge and belief.
Again, if a construct is to be multiply connected, it
cannot reside merely within that island universe which is
my personal experience. It has to make reference to the
universes we call other minds, and if the connection
fails, it must be rejected. This requires intersubjective
· agreement.
Perhaps the more basic concept of objectivity needs
discussion at this point. Objectivity in science may mean
two things: first, transsubjectivity, or the kind of docu
mentation that gives a personal experience an internal
stability, a coherence with other personal experiences
which causes it to be accepted as valid. To speak more
simply, when I see a spot of light in the dark sky and wish
to interpret it as a star, I first make sure that it is steady
and does not change its color periodically, like an airplane.
If I am in company, I ask whether others see it too, but
this is by no means essential. Any real doubt as to the
trustworthiness of my visual sensation can be dispelled by
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reference to other experiences within my private posses
sion: noticing whether the light appears where according
to my knowledge there ought to be a star, watching its
progression across the sky, seeing whether it reappears
tomorrow. All these are acts of internal checking, of
probing the consistency of my total experience when this
item is added to it-in short, of employing the validating
metaphysical principles (not including communality of
knowledge) together with empirical verifications. The
result is objectivity in the experience of seeing the star,
objectivity attainable through procedures involving only
private probings; it engenders a certainty that transcends
the subjective sensation; it generates transsubjectivity with
out intersubjectivity.
The last quality, also often identified with objectivity,
is what I have called communality of experience. It is a
corollary to the other, to me primary, form of objectivity
and arises automatically when consistency of understanding
(the principle of multiple connections) is extended to
those verifacts within private experience which are called
other persons.

4. The Requirement of Spatial and Temporal Abstraction
Since Descartes, physical science has flourished by using
a method he perfected. It involves the abstraction, through
physical intuition, of ever smaller and finer elements from
the spatiotemporal continuum. Greek science was wary of
it, having been impressed by Zeno's paradoxes. Modem
science has wrestled with the implications of this method
in the difficult mathematics of continua; in physics, how
ever, it did not follow the lead very far, for it invented the
concept of an atom, which is intended as a ban upon the
ultimate application of abstraction. To be sure, the ban
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was not taken altogether seriously; physicists continued
with a good deal of success to probe the interior · of the
atom, only to find other atoms. The latter, however, take
on increasingly perplexing qualities which make men
wonder whether the method of spatiotemporal abstraction
is being misapplied.
The style of analysis under discussion goes by other
names. The Germans call it anschaulich. De Broglie
identified it specifically with clarte Cartesienne; writers
looking for hidden variables call it causal. What it seeks
is invariably a determination of the spatially and tempo
rally large by the small, and it does not shrink from
infinitesimals. Our question is: Are we committed to this
sort of quest; should this tendency be set down as a meta
physical requirement of physics?
Let it first be acknowledged that there is nothing
intrinsically absurd in such a principle, indeed that it
appears at the same methodological level as causality,
though it is wholly different from it. If it is to be rejected
it must be on the grounds of inadequacy to the actual
state of science. Now, it seems to me that such inadequacy
has been clear and present since the beginning of the
century.
Perhaps most spectacularly, every annihilation process
involving quantized observables defies ultimate spatio
temporal abstraction. Consider pair annihilation. Electron
and positron necessarily have the rest mass m as long as
they exist. This mass is converted into energy of photons,
of amount 2mc2. How does this conversion take place if
it is to be understood under the requirement of temporal
abstraction? The masses must gradually melt away into
photon energy, in contradiction to everything we believe.
Hence, if temporal abstraction must be imposed, the trans
formation can only be sudden or catastrophal, and this,
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I take it, is actually a surrender of the method of spatio
temporal abstraction. Atomic physics presents a host of
similar examples.
The defeat of abstraction had already been suggested
by Bohr's early quantum theory. If an atom has truly
quantized states, then the "passage," i.e., the temporal
transfer in which our method forces us to believe, is not
only mysterious or difficult to understand (as physicists
often said); it is logically impossible. The atom can only
be in one or the other of these two states; to say that it
is in both at once acknowledges the fiasco of the method.
Physics has, of course, given it up in this instance. Yet its
desire for continuity was strong; 7 continuity could not
be found through ordinary spatiotemporal abstraction,
hence physics seized upon a variable that remains con
tinuous when simple abstraction fails and introduced
probability, the probability of the atom's appearing in one
of the quantized states upon measurement as distinct from
its being in them. One might say that probability saved
continuity at the price of spatiotemporal abstraction.
The very notion of classical causality, if taken seriously,
requires renunciation of the method. Whatever causality
may mean in detail, it suffices here to regard it as a relation
between states of a physical system which allows the
prediction of future states on the basis of its present state.
Suppose that an electron is a region of space filled with
substance, a fluid, perhaps, to which we cannot in principle
deny the possibility of complex motion. To be sure,
Lorentz and Abraham got away with simplifying assmnp
tions which gave it rigid structure, but these could at
best be only first approximations. In fact, they opened the
door upon an infinite regress, a never-ending abstraction
of spatial domains inside the electron, each with its own
causal destiny and its effects upon the others. There is
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no assurance that simple hydrodynamic models would
work in such a situation, and the prospect is an infinite
proliferation of presumed observable features which would
belie predictability. Hence, ultimate spatial abstraction
must be renounced to save causality.
With all these indications I find it difficult to concede
to the tendency under review the status of a methodo
logical requirement. True, it had the semblance of success
and still makes major claims, but progress has apparently
overtaken it. This conclusion also shows what attitude
one should take toward attempts to interpret quantum
mechanics in terms of spatiotemporal abstraction: they
may be worth while, for science does occasionally reverse
its trend. But if its progress is steady, they have two strikes
against them.
5. Conclusions
Our quest for the meaning of demonstration in physics
brought us face to face with two types of uncertainty
inherent in all confirmatory procedures: If the procedures
are inductive the conclusion is only probable; if deductive,
they are subject to the fallacy of the consequent. In the
latter case, helpful regulative principles, here called meta
physical, serve to minimize or limit the uncertainty; recog
nizing this important fact we reviewed the metaphysical
principles and their function in recent physics. And we
permitted ourselves a lengthy digression into problems
of the determination of method by cultural and political
concerns, intersubjectivity, and geometric abstraction-a
digression that was meant to bring an earlier analysis up
to date. We now return to the original question: Does
physical knowledge require a priori or undemonstrable
presuppositions?

HENRY MARGENAU

67

Stated with rigor and circumspection, the answer is
this. If allowance is made for the irremovable uncertainties
residing in the results of demonstration, if we do not ask
for more than what our analysis has proved attainable,
then physical knowledge requires no undemonstrable
presuppositions. If we ask for certainty, for explanations
that are unchangeable and eternal in our search for phys
ical knowledge, then all of it is based on undemonstrable
propositions.
The use of the term a priori is a little troublesome,
though natural, in this connection. Its classical sense, made
famous by Kant, can hardly be maintained today.8 If it
is nonetheless adopted, the required metaphysical prin
ciples are half a priori, half a posteriori, the former because
they come epistemologically (though not genetically) be
fore observational experience; the latter because they are
born pragmatically from experience and change with use.
To the extent that these principles are a priori, then, it
must be affirmed that physical knowledge requires a priori
presuppositions.
Our first answer, however, which bespeaks the intrinsic
uncertainty of all scientific knowledge, has an aspect of
triviality, and one gets a feeling that it misses what this
symposium is about. Granted, you may say, we can never
be certain of all details of scientific objects, as for example
of the properties which present understanding assigns to
an elementary particle; nevertheless, our belief in their
very existence is not founded on undemonstrable pre
suppositions. There is after all a vast gulf between belief
in the existence of electrons and belief in the existence of
gods, and it is this difference that our discussion intended
to examine.
On the plane of principles, metaphysical or otherwise,
I can see no difference between gods and electrons. The
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demonstration of one involves the same logical movements
as the demonstration of the other. There may be a· differ
ence in the degrees of success when the final necessary
appeal is made to empirical observation. But the widest
disparity in this comparison appears when one examines
the specific manner in which the metaphysical principles
are applied to one instance and to the other. Again, the
requirement of multiple connections is the decisive issue.
The construct electron is rich in relations to other valid
constructs; it is pervaded by many validating circuits of
confirmation, is a pivotal link in many chains of physical
reasoning, bears numerous correspondences to the plane
of perceptions. The concept God, at least in some of its
connotations, is almost insular, devoid of the fullness of
relations with other verifacts that are enjoyed by physical
concepts. This is certainly true if it is posited, as it often
is, merely for certain kinds of satisfaction which do not
culminate in verification. 9
The second and perhaps more meaningful answer to
the title question, then, is available if one reconstructs
the question slightly and puts it as follows: Does physical
knowledge require insular constructs, that is, ideas, postu
lates, or concepts inaccessible to demonstration and un
connected with other demonstrable constructs? The answer
to this is clearly no, and the reason lies, perhaps para
doxically, in the metaphysical presuppositions of science.

4
Does "Knowledge" of Physical Laws and Facts
Have Relevance in the Moral and Social Realm?
GEORGE P. KLUBER TAN Z, S.J.

ANY significant discussion of morality must be
placed in the context of the contemporary discussions.
You will forgive me if I summarize briefly the recent
history of ethical theory. At the beginning of this century
the British philosopher G. E. Moore examined the work
of his predecessors in ethics and maintained that all of
them had fallen into what he called "the naturalistic
fallacy." 1 According to him, instead of investigating and
clarifying what it is that men ought to do, they gave
accounts of what men were doing. They confused, he said,
"is" and "ought." In his view it was impossible by an
examination of the facts to arrive at any moral criteria
or any moral judgment. He maintained that the knowledge
of the good was obtained only by intuition. No other
process could ever reveal to us what good was or what a
particular good was. By "intuition" he meant a direct and
immediate knowledge that neither could be proved nor
needed any proof.
Next on the field of ethical theory came the movement
69
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which is sometimes called logical positivism. In their
examination of ethical theory the positivists agTeed with
Moore that it was absolutely impossible to derive an
"ought" from an "is." 2 But, in addition, they attacked
Moore's intuitionism, which they declared nonexistent.3
Hence, in their first treatments the positivists flatly
maintained that all moral propositions were simply non
sense. The recent successors of the positivists, namely, the
British analysts, have not taken such a rigid view. Instead
they have maintained that so-called ethical propositions
are really not statements of fact but statements of attitude.
According to them, "This is good" means, "I like this,"
"I approve of it"; and it may or may not imply, "I want you
to do the same."
In this country, ethical theory and ethical practice have
been discussed repeatedly by pragmatists and instru
mentalists. What is common to both these theories is
that the good is defined "as that which is useful, success
ful." Let us look a little more closely at the statement,
"The moral good is that which is successful, or, leads to
further goods." If we expand this statement in terms of
the meaning of good which it contains, then we must say
that the moral good is that which leads to further goods
which are goods because they lead to further goods-and
so on. Now, when the very meaning of the term is thus
cast into an infinite regTess, the basic meaning of the whole
set of propositions disappears.
Many American philosophers attempt to escape the
meaninglessness of such an infinite regTess by using social
norms (social approval, or the generally accepted stand
ards). But, as the British analysts have pointed out, it is
one thing to say, "The society in which I live approves
of certain actions"; it is another to say, "I ought to pay
attention to what society approves of." The second propo-
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sition cannot ever be justified by an appeal to society itself.
For this would be a completely circular justification, and
would amount to no more than saying, "Society approves
of my following what society approves of."
As William James had already seen, one possibility
would be to shift the meaning of usefulness or success
from the objective outcome of the action to the subjective
relationship. Now, if we take pragmatism in this broad
sense-as allowing the meaning of good to consist in the
satisfaction of personal wants and desires-then indeed
we avoid the infinite regress of meaning, but we seem to
be reduced by another route to the same situation in which
British theory finds itself.
It would seem then that right and wrong consist ulti
mately in nonrational, inexplicable, and even groundless
likes and dislikes, for there is no knowledge process by
which ethical theory and moral facts and obligations can
be ascertained. Does this entail the end of any meaningful
discussion of moral problems? The analysts seem to have
accepted this conclusion, to have allowed rational discus
sion only about the logic of moral propositions, not their
content. If this were the final word, my assignment would
be simple enough. To the question, does physical "knowl
edge" have any relevance in the moral realm? I should
have to answer, In principle, none; in practice, if people
should happen to agree, such knowledge has a secondary
function of clarification-or something like that.
In common with many philosophers 4-and, I think,
with most nonphilosophers-1 believe that there is a ra
tional way to talk about the moral good. I do not intend
to offer you yet another ethical theory to compound the
confusion, but rather to suggest a way in which we can
combine the proven conclusions of the various theories
into an acceptable and successful way to explain the nature
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and the knowledge of the moral good. I should like to
ask for one limitation on our considerations and "discus
sions: namely, that we should not begin with particular
moral problems on which there is widespread and violent
disagreement. I propose instead that we restrict our dis
cussions to a few fairly simple cases on which we can
safely presume that all of us agree-the evil of lying, or
that of deliberately causing pain without any need or
reason; or, again, the positive obligations of telling the
truth in science, or of alleviating the pain of others. In
such examples we can successfully investigate our real
knowledge that there are obligations and consider how this
knowledge has been won. From this, we can then draw a
number of general conclusions that will help us to answer
the general question: What is the relevance of knowledge
of physical facts and laws in the moral and social realms?
The first step in such an analysis is to determine the
meaning of moral good. In the light of the philosophical
discussions we have just reviewed, two points become
clear. First, the good is neither a thing in itself, nor an
absolute inhering quality of a thing. When, for example,
a mountain climber is asked why he wants to climb moun
tains and he says, "Because the mountain is there"-this,
obviously does not answer the question. The mountain
is there, it is tall and rugged, and so on. But, no matter
how we amplify these physical descriptions, in no way
do they answer the question: Is the mountain a good?
Moreover, the same is true of any action. Yet, is not
an action of helping another a good? This is a crucial
instance. An action of helping another-this action has a
physical reality. It consists, let us say, in bringing food to
a person in desperate need of it. What is done can be
observed, described with care, analyzed in terms of various
forces and movements; in short, an entire factual descrip-
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tion can be given of the action taken simply in itself. Is
there anything in the course of this description which
makes the action good? Or, perhaps, is the whole action
good even if none of the parts are? It would seem that we
cannot say so. To show that this is not the case, we can
put it into different conditions. For example, let us con
sider the father of a family whose child is in immediate
and desperate need. This man is at the point of giving
the necessary food to his own child. At the moment when
he is doing so he sees before him a stranger in equal need.
If he simply leaves his child to starve and goes on to feed
the stranger, is his action still good? I think at this point
all of us would hesitate. We would be inclined to say,
"It is no longer good to abandon one person to save
another; at least, it is not clearly an obligation."
This second case can lead us to see why we call an action
good. ,ve do not consider an action good because there is
either in some element or in the whole of the action
considered in abstraction a physical quality which we can
call goodness. To this extent we must agree with the
criticisms directed against the naturalistic fallacy. It is
simply not possible to consider good as if it were some kind
of absolute quality. But we need not therefore have re
course to some nonphysical quality. The equally forceful
criticisms by the positivists of G. E. Moore's intuitionism
precisely go to show that good cannot be a nonnatural
quality either.
The action we are considering is good only when viewed
in relation to the total situation. Now, from this we should
be led to see that good is not an absolute quality of any
one thing. Can we then say that good is a relational
attribute? Let us see whether this will help us in our two
previous types of cases. ·with regard to things-the moun
tain is not good in itself if it is viewed simply and non-
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relationally. But if, for example, it is viewed as a challenge
to a mountain climber, then it is good for someone. The
action of helping another is not good considered simply
in itself. But it is good for some one who does have food
to give to another.
But have we not thereby fallen into the pitfall of emo
tive ethics? "The good is what I like," and since what
I like is a purely arbitrary choice, then, the moral good
is a purely arbitrary consideration that can be disregarded.
Or, if we take account of it, it is purely private. There
cannot be any objective agreement; and, if agreement
must be found, we shall have to look elsewhere-to legal
coercion or social conformism.
This would be a sorry escape indeed. But is it necessary
that we have recourse to some kind of arbitrary, whimsical
choice, or unfounded and baseless desire? There is another
way which is both more obvious and more 1·ealistic. Let
us begin again with things. Quite likely we can grant
that the desire to climb mountains is somewhat personal.
In fact, to the extent that is a merely personal response
to the mountain's presence, most men would be inclined to
· say that it is not moral at all. There is lacking in it any
kind of necessity. On the other hand, if we turn from
mountain climbing, which is entirely free and arbitrary,
to something necessary, for example, food, the case is
different. Food also is not good in itself as simple and
absolute being; food is good for someone. But food is
good for someone not merely because he has an arbitrary
desire for food. It is good for someone who has a need
for food. This need is not arbitrary, conventional, artificial,
subject to free choice. Nor are we concerned with whether
people like to eat or not. It is, of course, true that most
people enjoy eating; but the goodness of food does not
lie in its relationship to the pleasure that is usually ex-
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perienced. Neither do biologists discover that organisms
need food solely by examining all organisms and then
drawing a kind of rough generalization. They are able to
say: an organism needs food, because it has a certain
structure and a particular kind of material. In other words,
the need for food is natural to living things. It is therefore
correct to say that we can have some knowledge of a nature.
By the term nature I mean the internal constitution of
a thing-like a man, a maple tree, a monkey-which is the
source of its constant specific tendencies and of the activi
ties proper to it. A nature is relatively permanent; it is
manifested by activities and is logically connected with
them. To speak of "human nature," for example, is not
merely a useless way of restating the original facts or a
verbal trick adding something to the facts. A man is a
man even while he sleeps, that is, while he is not actually
performing some of the activities peculiar to man. Nature,
then, is a real, concrete, structured possibility of acting.
Granted that man's nature is not the same kind of
nature that we would find if we were dealing with gold
or silver or other chemicals, it remains true that something
can be said about human nature. 5 Consequently, at least
in principle, the term to which "good" is referred can be
investiga ted with some hope of success, some hope of
objectivity, and, consequently, some hope of agreement
(though there have been very considerable disagreements
not only about what human nature really is but also about
the very possibility of knowing human nature objectively).
This is not a question of grasping by intuition, by some
mysterious immediate process, the entire nature of man; we
all recognize that such knowledge is not within our grasp.
Nor is there question of any a priori approach, any sort
of preconceived or analytically given notion of nature.
We can find out what man is in the same way and only in
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the same way as we find out what an organism is.6 We
have to study organisms and analyze their behavior: Simi
larly, from a study of what men do we can find out what
man is. The analysis of human nature is, however, not a
statistically summarizing process. We do not simply ob
serve man in all possible situations, then summarize,
generalize, abstract, and arrive at a set of universal descrip
tions. We find involved in the various activities of man
some basic characteristics common to a whole line of
activities, no matter how much those activities may differ
in other respects. For instance, we do not have any a priori
notion of rationality. We can only find out what rational
behavior is by examining what men do-including our
selves. Sometimes men perform actions which are reason
able; sometimes they act stupidly. Now, we do not strike
an average between the most intelligent behavior-for
example, that of a scientist, a statesman, a great artist
on the one hand, and the most stupid, ignorant, super
stitious, irrational behavior on the other, and say that
human nature has as its characteristic behavior something
between the two extremes. ,ve observe human actions, and
we find in them, for example, an adaptation of means to
ends. Whether it is really an adaptation of suitable means
to proportioned goals, or whether it is an entirely blind
combining of means which leads to no success at all, in
both extremes we find the effort to adapt things and actions
for purposes. This is the kind of way in which we can
analytically study what men do to find out what man is.
Similarly, we do not find out either that man is free or
what freedom is by averaging together a bit of compulsive
behavior and a bit of fully deliberate rational choice and
then say this average is what freedom naturally is. Rather,
by examining carefully various kinds of behavior we dis
cover in some of them the exercise of freedom, and from
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this conclude what man can do if conditions are ideal.
The work of some contemporary anthropologists confirms
and in some respects clarifies the notion of human nature
that we derive from analysis and reflection. 7 Not only man's
merely organic needs but also his strictly human needs
the need for love, for friendship, for association, for
development, opportunity, scope for freedom-all these
things can be established to be real and true human needs.s
Next, is the simple natural relation of hunger and food
itself a moral one? We would of course recognize that
animals also need food and that food for a hungry animal
is good. Would we be inclined to say that the animal was
behaving morally? We would indeed say that it was be
having naturally. Though some philosophers may have
maintained that animals behave morally in seeking food,
I do not think the majority do so. There is still something
lacking. If morality is a peculiarly human quality, then
something about the relational situation which we qualify
as morally good must be peculiarly human. It is not
peculiarly human to need food, but it is peculiarly human
to have a recognition of this fact and to be able to judge
how it is best fulfilled. \Vhat raises the merely natural
good to the level of a moral good is its submission to
reason. That is morally good which bears a relationship
to a natural need or tendency inasmuch as this relationship
is judged by reason and its use is guided by reason. The
moral good is a reasonable good. What do we mean by
qualifying an action as "reasonable"? \Ve mean that it is
not haphazard, random, arbitrary, merely impulsive, but
is justifiable. We mean, positively, (a) that it is taken in
relation to the entire context of the objective situation,
especially in relation to its consequences, and (b), on the
subjective side, that all man's tendencies be considered in
their essential order, not just one in isolation. 9
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Moreover, reasonableness in action can be objectively,
impersonally judged; it is neither subjective, nor - a con
ventional, customary norm. For example, biologists and
doctors have criteria which, although they have been
arrived at by an examination of particular cases, are not
merely an average or a conventional standard. The amount,
or quality, or kind of food that the human organism needs
is not arrived at by examining the eating habits of all the
races of men in all their cultures and then extracting an
average which is named the reasonable amount; much less
does the doctor judge by what he himself eats. If a doctor
wants to give a patient a suitable diet, he considers such
factors as weight, state of health, type of activity, availa
bility of foods, and by means of these considerations arrives
at a quite impersonal and objective judgment.
At least at many levels it is possible to see that one use
of a particular physical thing or action is reasonable and
another not. Thus, let us examine the action of telling the
truth as compared with that of telling a lie. There is an
external action of communicating through words or other
external signs what is in a man's mind. As the other term
of the relation, there is a man who has knowledge, a power
of communicating, and a need and desire to communicate
with his fellow men. Now, what is the reasonable way to
use communication? Note, we do not say that a man must
talk or otherwise manifest his mind; 10 but, if he engages
in communication and at the same time chooses to do so
in such a way that he does not manifest his mind but rather
something contrary to it, then the action is unreasonable.
If, then, lying is unreasonable, it is a moral evil. On the
other hand, telling the truth is a reasonable use of an ex
ternal action corresponding to the need and tendency of
man and judged by reason to be suitable in the concrete
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circumstances, as well as guided by reason: therefore, it is
morally good.
Now, with all this in mind, we can intelligibly approach
the proper topic that I have been directed to examine: Is
there any relevance of physical laws and facts for the
moral and social realm? To the extent that such laws and
descriptions clarify the nature of the object or action that
man is thinking of performing, they are relevant to moral
ity. Let us again take a simple example. Ordinarily men
proceed on the assumption that those foods which are tasty
are also healthful, and in many cases simple sensory re
sponse is a sufficiently good criterion. There is no question
and no need for any more elaborate knowledge of the ob
ject. But it is unfortunately true that this criterion is not
always applicable. Ptomaine poisoning, for example, is not
discoverable merely by the taste of the food. Here a scien
tific knowledge of what ptomaine poisoning is, how it is
caused, and how it can be prevented is of great use and
indirectly enters into a moral consideration. If man is to
use food reasonably, the food he eats ought to be such as
not only to be palatable but also, and principally, health
ful, nourishing. Food that in spite of its appearance and
good taste is not healthful ought to be avoided by a reason
able man; therefore, it would be immoral to use, sell, or
give it to others. To the extent, then, that scientific tech
niques are sometimes necessary to find out which food is
healthful or unhealthful, even in the simple decision about
the right use of food we may be obliged to make use of
complex scientific knowledge. This example can be ap
plied to a very urgent contemporary case, the effect of fall
out on certain foods. The physical knowledge possessed
only by carefully trained scientists is nevertheless a matter
for everyone's moral consideration, and must influence
everyone's own individual moral choices.
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The same case can be made to illustrate the bearing of
physical knowledge on social decisions and actions. So
ciety is concerned with the common good, the common
welfare, the welfare of all. Now, suppose that someone is
doing something which has as a long-term result the ex
tensive poisoning of the food supply of an entire nation.
The intrinsic character of the real sensible object cannot
be discovered by immediate sensory response, but instead
needs very elaborate means. Yet society, through its re
sponsible authorities, is obliged to take scientific knowl
edge into account in allowing, controlling, or stopping the
action which is causing these effects. To illustrate with an
other very pertinent case. Only a scientist can give an ade
quate account of the likely effects of nuclear warfare, which
are beyond the grasp of the ordinary untrained person.
Nevertheless, what the physicist can establish to be the
probable effects of extensive nuclear explosions can change
our moral judgment about war and the testing of nuclear
weapons.
But this case, obvious as it seems to be, can be misinter
preted. First, it is not precisely as physicist that the phys
icist proclaims the evil of nuclear warfare, if he does, but
as a man who has in addition to his human judgment the
advantage of much more knowledge of relevant facts. Sec
ond, the harm to human life, great as it is, is not an abso
lute evil. The reason is that physical life and physical
health are not absolute goods. As we have seen earlier, for
a moral good, there are needed not only a suitable object
and a natural tendency but also the judgment of reason.
Now, a preservation of life or health which involves a de
nial of truth, a betrayal of good, a surrender of freedom,
is no longer to be chosen automatically. Instead, reason
must weigh the two sets of consequences-their importance
for a truly human life, the probability or certainty that
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they will occur, and so on. And, in the light of these con
siderations, it could be that the right moral judgment
would be to risk the physical evil to preserve the rational
,good.
Next, we must ask: What about the relevance of phys
ical laws to moral judgments? From one point of view,
scientific laws are general propositions that state relations
between classes of facts. As such, they have the same kind
of relevance for moral judgment that particular facts have.
There is some difference in that particular facts are part
of the present situation, whereas laws are more likely to
enter into moral judgment as giving us knowledge of fu
ture consequences. But, since consequences are merely fu
ture facts, they are not moral goods in themselves, any
more than present facts are. Furthermore, since the facts,
taken absolutely, cannot be moral, the laws relating them
are not moral laws. As Professor Margenau said, scientific
truth is not established by, nor to be judged by, the effects
of the use of that knowledge upon human beings. A prop
osition, a law, or a theory is not true because it is useful,
or desirable, but, by the same token, because it is true it
is not necessarily good.
Scientific laws, however, are usually more than just em
pirical generalizations. Usually they are refined according
to the requirements of theory, and so we must look for a
moment at physical theory. 11
According to the terminology I am using, scientific
theory is at a higher level of generalization than law, con
nects laws rather than facts directly, and is deductively
related to these facts. By this I mean that, if we grant the
theory, the laws and facts follow as logical consequences.
In relation to facts and laws already known, theory stands
as explanation, as intelligible ground or reason. For an
acceptable scientific theory this is not enough; theory must
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be "fruitful": it must suggest new experiments hitherto
unthought of, whose outcomes, predicted by the theory,
constitute its "verification." For this reason, many scien
tists, though not all, admit the legitimacy of theoretical
elements in the structure of science.
As most contemporary philosophers of science agree,
theory consists of rational constructs. These "products of
the scientific imagination" are by no means arbitrary; their
form is controlled by the facts and laws, and they give con
sistency and connection between more particular laws.
Hence, theory can be true or false; or, if we are squeamish
about this terminology, theory can be correct or incor
rect. It is fashionable in some quarters today to suggest that
such remote propositions are statements only about our
selves as observers rather than about the things. Granted
that this is sometimes so, I believe that an interpretation
that makes this necessary in principle is at variance with
the whole spirit of science. It seems to me that the basic
attitude of science is realistic. But, also, scientific truth is
not simply that of a descriptive or historical proposition.
A fortiori, the truth of a theory is not that of a naive iso
morphism. The truth of a theory is defined by the laws
from which it arises and the new results to which it leads.
For these reasons, theoretical concepts no longer express
the direct intelligibilities of things and activities. But it is
concrete things and activities with which moral judgments
are concerned. So, the presence of harmful radiation in
food directly affects my moral judgment concerning my
use of that food, or my activities which might increase such
activity. But, for example, the interior structure of an
atom, the nature of "distances" between intra-atomic par
ticles, the presence or absence of parity, the amount of
angular momentum, seem to have no direct influence on
human action and moral judgment, important as they are
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for scientific theory and even scientific experiment. In
deed, it is hard to see how propositions like this could be
thought to impinge upon the sphere of moral behavior.
True, there have been writers who have claimed for sci
entific theory an impact far greater than what I have al
lowed for. It is sometimes said that human freedom would
be in conflict with determinism, that the human mind is
incapable of knowledge beyond the scope of sense experi•
ence, that the human being is so much a part of nature as
to be one with it, that morality is so interwoven with
superstition that it must be abandoned wholesale, and so
on. To my way of thinking, such propositions are not sci
entific but philosophical, and so not necessarily connected
with any scientific law or theory-certainly not of the phys
ical sciences.
In fact, even the life sciences develop theoretical con
structs which are not directly significant for moral judg
ment, even though they are intimately connected with
what is distinctive about moral behavior, the nature ot
man. For example, the harm caused by an uncontrolled
use of drugs is discoverable apart from any explanatory
account of how drugs affect personality. Nor do we judge
the evil any differently when we know that there are psy•
chological factors which bring a man to the use of drugs.
This is not to say that we do not judge the drug addict
differently; we may well decide that drug addiction is a
disease rather than a moral fault. But, fault or disease, we
still consider it morally wrong to allow a pusher free access
to our school playgrounds. And this is the point I am trying
to make.
In summary, a science which is engaged in the discovery
of facts and laws and the construction and verification of
theories to explain them does not have the logical possi
bility of making moral judgments. But because moral good
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is a relational attribute which implies two terms: the thing
or action in itself, and the natural need or tendency of
man, any factual knowledge, including the scientific, of
either of these terms in their mutual relation does have
relevance in the moral and social realms.

5
Dualistic Pictures and Unitary Reality
in Quantum Theory
ALFRED LANDE

1. Critique of Dualism
ERNST MACH once observed: "There is no cause
nor effect in nature; nature simply is. Recurrences of like
cases exist only in the abstraction which we perform for
the purpose of mentally reproducing the facts." To which
one may add: the mental reproduction of facts in the form
of a methodical schema, or law, or theory must of course
be checked for its empirical adequacy. And it ought to be
evaluated also under the criterion of simplicity or economy
of thought. Under these criteria determinism has been
found wanting and has been replaced in modem quantum
theory by statistical law. But, again, paraphrasing Mach:
nature as such is not quantal or dualistic; nature simply
is. Although there is no question as to the empirical ade
quacy of the half-corpuscular, half-undulatory quantum
formalism, I doubt whether the present dualistic ideology
approaches the ideal of simplicity, with or without the
copious literature trying to make dualism more palatable
to the ordinary mind and to the physicists themselves. It
would certainly be preferable to have a unitary theory,

85

86

The Nature of Physical Knowledge

either resting on a continuous concrete substratum sup
porting waves with occasional corpuscular appearances, or
assuming discrete particles as the real constituents of mat
ter which occasionally produce the appearance of waves.
Here I must ask your indulgence for using the words
"real" and "apparent" in the same ordinary sense as when
a stratified layer of clouds is said to appear like a continu
ous train of waves, yet upon closer inspection is found in
reality to consist of many droplets in a statistical arrange
ment. It is true that in the microphysical domain the sit
uation is more complicated, because, the closer one looks,
the more blurred the picture becomes in some of its fea
tures. From a purely empirical viewpoint it thus may be
hard to arrive at an immediate decision in favor of one or
the other "mental picture." But how about the criterion
of simplicity?
Instead of scrutinizing and improving the quantum
ideology under this criterion, physicists, like other people
in a quandary, have sought refuge in philosophical reflec
tion rather than taking positive action. It is argued: why
set up unnecessary problems when the answer is so simple?
There is a fundamental principle of duality; and the equal
rank of corpuscles and waves as mental pictures is assured
by their give and take in the principle of complementarity.
Besides, what is the difference between physical appear
ance and physical reality, anyway? The idea of a real world
behind the phenomena is a metaphysical dream. And it is
precisely the quantum theory that has given us the "epis
temological lesson" that an objective reality, independent
of the means applied by an observing subject, should not
even be a topic of intelligent discussion. Let us be content,
then, with two pictures or constructs whose union so ade
quately describes the facts.
This positivist viewpoint of Bohr and Heisenberg is of
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course diametrically opposed to the realism of Einstein,
who with reference to the quantum dilemma declared: 1
"The concepts of physics refer to a real external world in
which 'things' (material bodies, fields, etc.) claim to have
real existence independent of perceiving subjects." To
this I would add that, carrying the philosophical discussion
about "reality," or lack of it, into natural science is, in
my opinion, a misuse of philosophy for the profane end of
brushing off an important internal problem of atomic
physics. In the case of stratified clouds nobody will speak
of two mental pictures, one of waves and one of droplets
irrespective of the philosophical reflection that our "ex
ternal world" is a mental picture. One rather will weigh
all the evidence and use his reason to decide which he will
accept as "real," cloud waves or discrete droplets. In atomic
theory it is just as imperative, and possible, too (see section
2), to establish a simple, realistic, and unitary theory in
which the "quantum miracle" of a wavelike misbehavior of
particles becomes a necessity. But let me tell the story in
historical order.
Schrodinger, from 1925 up to this day, has consistently
taken the stand that only matter waves are real, that par
ticles are mere appearances, perhaps high wave crests in
the wave field, in the sense of unitary field theory. And
what looks like momentum conservation for particles in
collision is actually a resonance phenomenon of interfer
ing matter waves. As late as 1953 Schrtidinger declared: 2
"There is, I think, no other way of accounting for the
atomicity of matter than by admitting the eigenvalues of
the wave equation to be discrete." Few quantum physicists
look with favor on this view.
In 1926 Max Born suggested that, in spite of matter ray
diffraction, only particles are the real constituents of mat
ter, as confirmed by many decades of atomic theory as well
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as by the observation that the diffracted intensity pattern
is built up by individual corpuscular impacts, on·e after
another, in a statistical fashion. Born's unitary particle in
terpretation, which regards Schrodinger's wave amplitude
as a "probability amplitude," has been accepted by most
physicists, myself included.
Born's victory was watered down, however, by diplo
matic intervention from the neutral country of Denmark
through a third view, which wants to have it both ways.
We are told that an electron, strictly speaking, is neither
particle nor wave. Instead, both particles and waves are
mental pictures of equal rank, neither having a preference
over the other; rather, they complement each other. Born
himself has lately become neutral and dualistic. In an
otherwise most illuminating article of 1953 3 he declares.
that water waves and electromagnetic waves are "real" by
virtue of having certain invariant characteristics. But then
he continues: "Why then should we withhold the epithet
'real' even when the waves represent in quantum theory
only a distribution of probability?" My answer is similar
to that of the good Doctor Johnson rejecting the subjec
tivistic idealism of Bishop Berkeley: you can kick, and be·
hurt by, a stone as well as by a particle and by a water
and an electromagnetic wave; but you cannot kick, or be
hurt by, a list of statistical fractions. Putting such a list
of betting odds, compiled according to past experience
even when this list can be graphically represented by a
wavelike curve-on the same plane of "reality" with those
particles whose average fate is represented by the "curve"
is indulging in a linguistic trick for the sole purpose of
saving face for an obsolete dualism, obsolete ever since
Born interpreted wavelike appearances as actually pro
duced by particles.
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And here I come to the root of the "quantum mess." The
same people who accept Born's clear and realistic unitary
particle interpretation also do homage to the dualistic and
neutral doctrine of Bohr and Heisenberg, occasionally also
relapsing into the ideology of unitary wave theory (e.g., in
the so-called contraction of a wave packet of Heisenberg's,
which in fact rests on a vacillation between two meanings
of the word "state," 4 physical state of an object versus state
of expectation of an observer). This double- or triple-think
is defended by semiphilosophical argument, such as, quot
ing von W eizsacker, 5 "Perhaps we can best speak of the
collapse of the category of substance; perhaps we should
rather speak of the necessity of adapting our logic, formed
by thinking in objects, to the new situation."
Adapting our logic? And to which new situation? Every
body knows that the elastic data of a piece of iron, and
viscosity data of the same piece of iron in the molten state,
are mutually incompatible observables; one must never
even think that both data could be possessed by the same
piece of iron at the same time, one overt and the other
hidden. This example is even more "quanta!" than that of
position q and momentum p, which can be possessed simul
taneously. For example, a particles are emitted by a radio
active substance with a well-known momentum p; when
they hit a screen at a certain place q, they arrive at q with
momentum p. Only the future p in a subsequent experi
ment cannot be predicted (Margenau 6) better than with
margin
ap ~ h/Sq
This uncertainty relation would have no physical meaning
unless exact p values belonging to a given range aq are first
observed, and then found to be scattered over a range ap
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(K. R. Popper 7). The scatter 'dp of exact p values for given
'dq of a particle gives us an important lesson in mechanics.
But it is hard to see why it should give us an epistemolog
ical lesson, compel us to change our logic and not to think
in objects any more, etc. Those profundities seem to have
but one end: to save the pre-Born dogma of a fundamental
duality according to which "an electron is neither particle
nor wave," instead of simply conceding that electrons and
other particles statistically behave in a wavelike fashion,
and we still do not know why. Refer to section 2, however,
for an explanation.
The question "why" is hardly answered by the allega
tion (von Weizsacker 5) that "an electron, under certain
experimental conditions, behaves as though it were a wave
filling the whole space." This "as though" ignores the key
consideration of Duane 8 of 1923 that the periodic pattern
on a screen is due to the mechanical activity of the periodic
crystal "filling the whole space" rather than to a mythical
wave character of the electron filling the whole space.
Duane's systematic quantum-mechanical particle interpre
_tation of the wavelike diffraction (which preceded Born's
particle interpretation of the 'Ji function by three years)
has been ignored also by Bohr in his long and inconclusive
"Discussion with Einstein," 9 which otherwise could have
been resolved in a few pages.
What can be the reason that physicists accept the statis
tical particle interpretation in their everyday work, yet pay
lip service to a dualistic ideology which replaces objective
physics by an evaluation of subjective expectations and
mental pictures? The reason, in my opinion, is that neither
Duane, nor Born, nor their successors have ever proceeded
from interpretation to an explanation as to why, i.e., on
the grounds of which elementary nonquantal features of
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particle mechanics, said particles (or bodies in general)
should display wavelike interference phenomena and peri
odicity in space and time; e.g., why is E = hv and p = h/"A.?
Reference to a "principle" of duality is no better than say
ing that people are poor because of their poverty. I think,
however, that Duane-Born's particle interpretation of un
dulatory quantum phenomena can indeed be supple
mented by an explanation based on a few elementary,
almost self-evident, nonquantal ground postulates from
which one arrives at the same amazing rules of quantum
mechanics which are usually introduced ad hoc or as mani
festations of "quantum principles." I can report on these
developments only in the most perfunctory manner. For
details refer to the physical literature.10
2. Unitary Foundations of Quantum Mechanics
As a first step one has to renounce the determinism of
classical mechanics in favor of still unspecified statistical
laws for the transition of a specified object (particle, atom,
field, etc.) from state to state in response to macroscopic
testing instruments such as a position meter, an energy
meter, a momentum meter, and so forth. Let us call these
testing instruments an A-meter, B-meter, etc. From an
A-meter test our object can emerge only in one of the A
states, A1 or A 2 or A 3, etc., respectively. The B-meter test
leaves the object in one of the B states, B1 or B2 or Ba, etc.
Suppose that the object has emerged from an A-meter test
in the state A 3• If it is now subjected to a B-meter test, its
emergence in the particular state B5 occurs with a definite
statistical frequency, P(A3, B5), also known as the transi
tion probability from A 3 to B5• The various transition
probabilities from the A-states to the B-states can be

92

The Nature of Physical Knowledge

ascertained experimentally and then be compiled in a table
or "matrix" of the form
P(A1, B1) P(A1, B2) · ·
P(A2, B1) P(A2, B2) · ·

= P(A, B)

Similarly there are tables P(B, C) and P(A, C), and so forth,
pertaining to the same object. The transition probabilities
are two-way symmetric, P(A3 , B5) = P(B3 , A3) in corre
spondence with the reversibility of classical mechanical
processes. From this it follows that not only every row
but also every column in a P matrix adds up to unity.
One may therefore denote the P matrices as unit magic
squares.
As a second step let us assume that the various P tables
are connected by a (still unspecified) general correlation
law of "transformation" so that, when the tables P(A, B)
and P(B, C) are given, the table P(A, C) is thereby deter
mined, or at least restricted-as the length L(A, C) in a tri
angle is restricted when the lengths L(A, B) and L(B, C)
are given. The problem of figuring out possible forms of a
general correlation law of transformation between P tables
leaving their unit-magic-square quality invariant is a purely
mathematical proposition. There is only one conceivable
law that satisfies this condition of invariance, known as
the law of unitary transformation. It is precisely what the
physicist calls "interference for probability amplitudes."
It is best expressed in terms of intermediate quantities �
which are complex, but so that �(A., B1) is complex con
jugate to �(B1, A.), and the absolute square of both equals
P(Ak, B;) = P(B1, Ak). Complex quantities are often used
in physical theory for representing wavelike quantities hav
ing amplitude and phase. Therefore the physicist is
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tempted to see, in the law of unitary transformation, which
in matrix notation reads
�(A, C) = �(A, B) X �(B, C),
a "wave law." However, since a complex quantity can also
be represented by a vector in a plane, it is more adequate
to conceive the complex probability amplitude � as a
vector giving direction to the corresponding probability
P, so that all the P's together form a kind of structural
framework in a plane, as the lengths L(A, B), etc., connect
ing points A, B, C, · · · , in a plane form a geometrical
framework, with the associated vectors obeying the law
V(A, C) = V(A, B)

+

V(B, C).

Therefore, the "interference of probabilities" is not a wave
law impressed on particles by a strange whim of nature
wishing them to conform with Bohr's principle of comple
mentarity or duality. It rather is the only conceivable gen
eral correlation law between the probability tables (unit
magic squares), supposing that a general correlation law
exists at all, rather than chaos. Incidentally, a uniqueness
proof is still lacking; therefore the word conceivable rather
than possible has been used. The situation here is similar
to that of statistical mechanics, which has been erected
without a strict proof of ergodicity.
The third step which completes Duane-Born's statistical
interpretation into an explanation concerns the wavelike
periodicity rules of quantum dynamics, Planck's E = hv,
de Broglie's p = hj).., and their modem counterparts,
Born's commutation rule and Schrodinger's p-operator
rule, culminating in the Schrodinger wave function
�(q, p) = exp (2i7tqp/h).
The h-dominated quantum rules resulting m this wave
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function are usually introduced ad hoc. However, they
can be explained, i.e., deduced from the following well
known elementary features of linear coordinates q and
conjugate linear momenta p:
(a) Any physical quantity defined in terms of two
(or more) coordinates q' and q" shall depend on the
difference, q' q", rather than on absolute q values. The
same shall hold for p.
(b) The statistical density in q-space for given p is
constant, and the statistical density in p-space for given
q is constant.

Both (a) and (b) stipulate only that there is no preferred
system in q-space or in p-space, that is, invariance of me
chanics under Galileo and/or Lorentz transformations.
Neither (a) nor (b) is a quantum postulate. Yet, in combi
nation with the previously discussed interference law
(unitary transformation) with invariance of the unit-magic
square quality of the P tables, (a) and (b) lead by mathe
matical necessity to the result
4(q, p)

= exp (2i7Cqp/constant)

which is the backbone of quantum dynamics. The con
stant is called h; it must be a universal constant, the same
for all objects, because interaction between two objects
would be impossible if the one should give out quanta h
and the other could receive only quanta h' different from
h. The interference of probabilities and the wavelike
probability amplitude function 4(q, p) can thus be ex 
plained on the grounds of simple and general nonquantal
postulates of symmetry, invariance, and the like, on a
unitary statistical particle basis.
The same formal quantum rules can immediately be
applied also to a field when the field is first "mechanized,"
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i.e., represented by an energy function in terms of gener
alized field coordinates and field momenta. In the case of
an electromagnetic field the question is not: does light
consist of waves or of photons? It is rather: why does a
field vibration of frequency v display energy changes
E = hv only? The answer is that fields, like particles, are
subject to the general quantum rules that have been
known since 1926, but can also be explained as seen above.
A completely different question is that of the special
energy functions of various "fundamental" particles and
their fields. We here are concerned only with the general
formal quantum rules, not with their application to
special mechanical systems. The formal quantum rules,
however, can be understood without appealing to a
"principle" of duality. Duality remains as a superficial
appearance; it is not a fundamental principle in its own
right.

6
Metaphysics: Before or After Physics?
RAYMOND J. SEEGER

IT WOULD be interesting to ascertain the common
denominators of agreement and of disagreement of these
papers on The Nature of Physical Knowledge. Each one
of us, I suppose, would agree and disagree with each
speaker to some degree. My role as a discussant of the talks,
not of the topic, will be essentially that of an individual
critic. My only choice is whether to make everyone un
happy by criticizing each paper somewhat, or to make
myself unhappy by reviewing one paper completely. As
a compromise, I shall consider primarily the three papers
that were sent me before the meeting.
Our basic problem in this discussion is the philosophy
of physics, i.e., an attempt to answer certain perennial
questions which always arise along any broad approach to
the study of man and his environment. For example, from
the viewpoint of physics: Is the law of gravitation true?
Is a physical field real? Why study physics, anyway? The
philosophy of science, in general, is an attempt to get
common answers to these common questions from all
96
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scientific avenues, namely, physics, biology, psychology.
sociology: What is true? ·what is real? ·what is of value?
Three distinctive attitudes are typified by the statements:
"I do not know" (dogmatic agnosticism); "I do not know.
but" (indifferent skepticism); "I do not know, but I am
finding out more and more" (aggressive faith). We must
keep in mind throughout our discussion the peculiar
viewpoint, expressed or inarticulate, which each speaker
undoubtedly has with regard to these fundamental philo
sophical questions (including Professor Percy Bridgman's
belief that physics has "almost no recognizable philosophi
cal component"). Otherwise, there will be foggy confusion.
Our speakers seem to cover the entire gamut. Professor
Bridgman, who claims, "The scientist has no place for
faith," 1 fears that we may soon be involved in the law
of diminishing returns for science, inasmuch as its prob
lems are becoming more complex and seemingly fewer
new methods are available for their solution. In this
respect I note that George Gamow concludes his recent
book, Matter, Earth, and Sky, with an equally pessimistic
note. Viewing the frontiers of the universe for the very
large and for the very small, he draws an analogy with
the old discovery of the "new world" and hence the round
earth, which by its very finiteness limited further findings.
As the haze of quantum theory and of relativity spread
across Lord Kelvin's almost cloudless view, a glorious dawn
hailed a new day! We, too, can hopefully peer beyond our
seemingly inaccessible horizon.
In looking over the three papers one is struck at once
by an apparent lack of clarity due to the failure of precise
definition of the terms of the topic. No common ground
for discussion is evident. Professor Bridgman, it is true.
confesses his own qualms in this regard, particularly with
respect to the word nature; Professor George Klubertanz.
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indeed, seems to use it in the same sense as one does in
speaking of human nature. The word physical, too, is not
sufficiently definitive for satisfactory discussion. Professor
Bridgm an would have it include modern biological phases
and possibly some psychological aspects. What about the
other speakers? Knowledge (in quotation marks in the
title) seems to be an especially vulnerable concept for each
of the speakers, albeit they use the term science (it'S Latin
equivalent) with little such apprehensiveness. Professor
Bridgm an would avoid any distinction between physical
knowledge and any other so-called knowledge. He considers
that knowledge, in general, implies truth, which he him
self does not bother defining here-even operationally;
frankly, he wishes to avoid any suggestiveness as to platonic
ideas. Neither does Professor Henry Margenau find it
necessary to define physical knowledge, while regarding
certain "metaphysical" principles as prerequisite to any
such physical knowledge-Le., existing strictly before phys
ics, not after it. Thus he not only assumes a priori guides,
but he insists that they exist expectantly beyond the realm
of human senses. More difficult to understand are the
particular "metaphysical" principles which he regards in
some sense as only half a priori and half a posteriori (a
paradoxical contradiction of terms). One would wish some
operational or practical criteria for recognizing these un
defined aspects.
There is need for individual clarity, if not common
agreement, not only with respect to the words in the topic
itself, but even more with respect to other terms that are
frequently used by the speakers. Explanation is just such
a word. Professor Alfred Lande is evidently unhappy with
Max Born's atomic picture, inasmuch as it does not purport
to "explain" facts; i.e., it does not seek to relate them to
"familiar and simple general principles." He makes an
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interesting, but not logically necessary, characterization
of theories as being descriptive, interpretive, and explana
tive. Furthermore, Professor Margenau would view the de
ductive method as equivalent to explanation, somewhat
in the sense of Professor Lande, but not entirely so. He
likes to use the word exact in connection with such logical
consistency-exactly what I would not wish to do in
applications of mathematics to phenomena.
The word metaphysics, too, has been frequently used.
Professor Lande regards a metaphysical stage as "a hidden
power or principle that accounts for phenomena"; he
cites the old "horror vacui" as an example. Unfortunately
Professor Margenau has not found it necessary to give here
a clear-cut, complete definition of his own usage of this
term. In this connection I am reminded of a statement by
the late Richard von Mises: 2 "Every author that writes on
metaphysics more or less changes his boundaries."
Last, and most important, is the use of the term reality.
Professor Bridgman would urge physicists to avoid this
word reality as an anathema, although he admits grudg
ingly that measurements can be regarded as being physi
cally real. He observes rightly that physicists never deal
with complete reality. Professor Lande, on the other hand,
argues that every physicist must be a realist-like Einstein.
From a different viewpoint Professor Klubertanz, too,
believes that science should be realistic.
This casual usage of undefined terms results in the
evident lack of communicability among the participants.
Accordingly I should certainly agree with Professor Bridg
man that any panel must agree upon definitions before
attempting to discuss their applications-particularly at
a Socratic symposium on natural philosophy.
All these papers are concerned not just with the philoso
phy of physics, but with the broader question: What is
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physics? I shall not attempt to go into details as to their
individualistic answers, but rather indicate important
aspects that I personally would emphasize.
First, let us consider the experiential origin of physics.
Much has been said here of the need for repetitive experi
ences, which Professor Bridgman implies are essential. A
single explosion, of course, is not repetitive; but even
history does not strictly repeat itself. Apparent repetition
of an event is frequently due to our more or less simplified
view of it. We often say, "It happened again." But what
is "it"? How do we recognize "it"? How do we isolate an
event from its associations? Observed repetition depends
upon our operational ability (in principle, at least) to
identify approximate classes which may recur from time
to time. In this connection we assume tacitly the uniformity
of nature and require understandingly a community of
ideas, both of which serve as automatic checks upon any
verification beyond our personal confirmation (Professor
Bridgman's "intellectual integrity"). Isolated individuals,
such as Leonardo da Vinci, to be sure, may unknowingly
be correct, but ahead of their times. The rate of scientific
progress, however, depends upon the communicability of
ideas as well as upon their correctness. Professor Margenau
would apparently minimize the opinions of others in
comparison with his own self-knowledge. He would regard
personal transsubjectivity as a primary, objective fact
presumably as cogent as Professor Bridgman's private
"scientific" proof. But what about John Dalton's color
blindness? Would not his consistently colorful pictures
be different from those of other viewers? In these dis
cussions, as physicists, we seem to forget that, in all our
total experiences, we focus upon a few selective aspects,
which necessarily distort our own views of the phenomena
themselves. Man and his environment become a skeleton
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framework outlined quite differently by physicists and by
biologists, as well as by other scientists.
The other major component of physics is theory. All
the speakers-myself as well-agree as to the uncertainty
of physical knowledge. In particular instances, however,
I am inclined to be even more uncertain than some of
them. Professor Bridgman, for example, stresses the fact
that one should never state: "Not A is, because B is"; but,
rather, "A may be because B is." I should claim, more
cautiously, "A may be because B may be." Moreover, I
am not so positive as mathematically inclined Professor
Margenau that the deductive method is more significant
than the inductive one and, therefore, will produce a
greater exactitude of theory. (That comfortable word
exact again!) Deduction, indeed, when applied to natural
phenomena does not have any greater certainty in its
premises than induction in its conclusions. A deduction
is either a logical tautology restating what is implicitly
involved in the premise, or else a scientific proof based
upon inductive generalizations, which we call axioms.
Deduction and induction are experientially opposite sides
of the same coin. As far as I am concerned, the conservation
of momentum derived from Newton's laws of motion is
no less certain than the laws themselves-indeed, it may
be preferable as a starting point for certain purposes.
"Deductive uncertainty" involves empirical choice; "induc
tive uncertainty" is based upon theoretical choice. By no
means do I find that "those principles, metaphysical or
pragmatic, as you will, serve to minimize or limit the
uncertainty."
In other cases, I have apparently a greater feeling of
certainty. For example, Professor Lande views with alann
a particular kind of positivist philosopher who exhibits a
"world picture of his own making without claim to repre-
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sent real objective events in a real world." He regrets that
such positivists may look at "two pictures with the reserva
tion that neither picture is true." To me, a theory is
pragmatically "true" only in so far as it agrees with
observed facts, i.e., describes and predicts phenomena.
Our present difficulty with the concept of an electron
arises to some extent out of our desire to describe it in
familiar language as a particle or as a wave, whereas we
have no experiential basis for doing so. Professor Lande
views the use of both pictures as an immature composite
like a Greek mythological creature, say a centaur, half
horse and half man. Is it not possible, however, for us to
use different metaphors to describe the same situation?
We may note, "He is a lion in the fight"; or we may say,
"He won't give up the ship." In each case, a certain
characteristic is communicated without the necessity of
combining both pictures into a lion-eating ship or a ship
sailing lion-as when viewing different sides of a partially
hidden building. I endorse wholeheartedly Professor
Lande's desire to have a single picture-by all means in
classical terms, if possible. The question is whether or
not such a picture is humanly possible on the basis of
what we now know. At present, I find nothing more
logically satisfying than the principle of complementarity.
This is not the occasion to examine the details of Professor
Lande's ingenious and interesting presentation of quantum
mechanics.3 I would merely note a few personal misgivings.
In the first place, we cannot regard an electron as a
particle in all experimental setups. Even when we speak
of the mass m of an electron we generally extrapolate its
dependence upon speed to the condition of zero velocity.
Any such experiment will necessarily be related to the
measurement of its energy E with the measurement of its
conjugate time t-and hence an uncertainty t:.E related
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to an uncertainty �m. (I do wish physicists would not
speak so loosely of "masses which gradually melt away into
photon energy." After all, mass is truly conserved in such
a process.) We have not actually fixed an electron in space
and in time; hence we have no experimental evidence
that it behaves wholly like a macrocosmic particle. Now
an electron behaves like this, now like that! But what is
it-this elusive electron? I find difficulty also in recognizing
operationally the generality of Professor Lande's basic
probability function, !Ji(q, p), and its associated unitary
matrices. His argument seems to be based only on the
reasonableness of some specific instances. Finally, the equiv
alent mathematical formalism which he develops does
not happen to give me a "familiar" picture. I would, of
course, agree that the mathematical solution of a wave
equation need not be interpreted as a physical wave;
indeed, it does not have to be related to a physical or
mathematical model at all. Professor Lande's basic com
plaint seems to be that we all are concerned more with
what an electron does than why it does so. One is reminded
of Aristotle and of St. Thomas Aquinas who insisted upon
discerning an intelligible principle as to why a rock falls
and smoke rises, why a body moves at all, rather than as
to how bodies fall, as questioned by Galileo Galilei. There
is always a practical limit as to what any of us will accept
as "general, simple, and familiar." Certainly no single
theory has ever been in complete agreement with all
pertinent facts. Our theoretical choice 4 is dependent at
any time upon many factors, past, present, and future.
In short, as the speakers look at the experimental and
theoretical aspects of physics, they seem to be faced with
the need of agreeing first of all upon what physics itself is.
I should like to consider at greater length Professor
Margenau's interesting belief in the existence of meta-
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physical presuppositions such as simplicity, elegance, cau
sality, et al. 5 \Ve would certainly all agree that there are
such heuristic factors affecting the choice of hypotheses:
economy of thought, symmetry, invariance, etc. All of
us, for example, would probably subscribe at least to the
assumption that any theory should be simpler than the
facts it purports to describe.
The question today is whether these are truly meta
physical principles or merely pragmatic guides, as Philipp
Frank 6 suggests. Professor Margenau would regard them
as "metaprinciples." Although a definition is not given
explicitly by him here, the meaning seems sufficiently clear
from the context. But are they inherently scientific in
nature or essentially extrascientific (i.e., metascientific)
beyond observable nature? I note that Professor Margenau
defines science as "everything accessible to experience."
Why then should one not include these in the behavorial
sciences, say the sociology of science? Extrascientific or
"nonempirical" may imply merely a narrow definition
of science. I cannot subscribe to his artificial distinction
between socially acceptable elegance and socially produced
education-the former being presumably a metaphysical
principle; the latter, only cultural conditioning. Certainly
intersubjectivity, i.e., the communality of science, is an
inherently behavioral pattern of society, not a metaphysical
presupposition.
What are his "rational criteria" for selecting such meta
physical principles, as contrasted with social pragmatism?
Mach's economy of thought, to me, is basically a social
development of science-not necessarily a lodestar, which
he set out to reach. The cultural pattern, I believe, is an
important factor; it is not "socially neutral." For example,
so-called simplicity of mathematics depends upon the
mathematical knowledge and technical skill of the user,
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and is therefore a function of time. One would wish to
record all historical failures to designate simple things,
as well as remembered successes for any such proposed
principle. Professor Margenau's qualitative distinction be
tween a metaphysical principle and a physical theory, based
upon the quantitative difference of their half-lives, lacks
logical cogency. The explanation may be merely in the
more subjective component of the former and the more
objective aspects of the latter. Simplicity, indeed, may be
of value not so much for its esthetic relations as for the
dynamic impetus it gives to the developing of a theory,
say by the heuristic employment of models (including
mathematical ones). James Clerk Maxwell and Albert
Einstein were both able to generalize more easily because
of earlier, comparatively simple theories. Elegance and
beauty, cultural attributes, both vary with time and place.
As phenomena and their associated theories become more
complex, simplicity itself may fade into a nebulous con
cept-even into the grin of a vanishing Cheshire cat.
Symmetry, too, is certainly less binding in art today than
in the time of the Greeks. Nevertheless, does symmetry
remain a metaphysical principle of modern science? Has
the heuristic value of symmetry in dealing with the exist
ence of elementary particles been a coincidence of large
numbers-or an intrinsic phase of a universal design? How
shall we describe its failure to insure parity? What about
modern asymmetry tomorrow? Presumably complex phe
nomena might well show symmetric relations as a first
approximation, whereas essentially asymmetric, simple phe
nomena would never exhibit any symmetry at all. Would
Professor Margenau regard yesterday's Pythagorean glori
fication of integers, used even by Johannes Kepler, as a
metaphysical presupposition for science? What is the role
of such an idea today? Is it akin to the late Arthur Stanley
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Eddington's numerology? Would Professor Margenau have
regarded William Prout's hypothesis as a metaphysical
principle yesterday? What about now?
What, moreover, must one do in the case of inevitable
conflicts among such metaphysical principles, that are
unresolved in social usage? The general gas law, it is true,
may be relatively simple, but it certainly does not represent
enough economy of thought inasmuch as it does not
comprehend all the data contained in the less simple van
der Waals expression. Professor Margenau himself is aware
of this dilemma, but he does not propose to resolve it
by any hypermetaphysical principle. What is particularly
lacking in this restrictive view is the role of the human
imagination! Despite Professor Margenau's unforgettable
image of the neutrino as a "metaphysical gleam in Pauli's
eye," I myself see no aura of metaphysics about it. It was
a shrewd guess, and as such would normally be considered
as a part of the psychology of creation and invention.
There is nothing sacred or even rational about such a
practice. The primary question is its usefulness. Such
guides, indeed, are not necessarily "pre-empirical commit
ments," except in that a scientist may personally believe in
them. I would regard them as being born in experience and
subject to growth changes, riot prenatal conceptions
except in so far as our minds behave thus under certain
conditions. They are just as much a part of the structure
of physical theory as other presuppositions such as axioms
-all justified pragmatically by their usefulness.
As a discussant, I cannot properly present my own view
on this occasion. I would, however, emphasize a remark
of Max Born,7 namely, "Faith, imagination, and intuition
are as essential to science as in any other human activity,"
although I would not necessarily agree with his design ating
such a belief a metaphysical principle. Factually, "we do
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not know, but we are finding out more and more." Conse
quently we all sketch a thoughtfully coherent world of
science out of the seemingly chaotic world of appearances.
Is it truly representative of an unknown world of nature
behind the phenomena-on the assumption that nature
itself exists? What about the relation between this sup
posedly unchanging world of nature and the changing
world of science? I cannot altogether agree with Professor
Margenau that "science will tell us what things are real."
Neither do I find or expect to find a one-to-one corre
spondence between these two worlds-possibly because of
the intermediacy of the brain, as stressed by Professor
Bridgman. Through the increasing descriptability of
science and the continuing predictability of its method
ology, one gains more and more confidence in the likeness
of the picture as a whole. To me, then, the dynamic world
of science is essentially a symbol pointing to an indistinct
invariant world of nature-the world of science created, to
be sure, subjectively in man's mental image, but not out
of nothing objective.
Professor Margenau has indirectly introduced some
strange gods to this meeting. I regret that he compares
good science with poor theology, although he admits the
possibility of good theology-parenthetically. Perhaps,
therefore, I may be permitted to complete my own view .8
I cannot endorse his belief that, "on the plane of principles,
metaphysical or otherwise, I can see no difference between
gods and electrons." On the contrary, the very nature of
a physical electron and that of a spiritual God make manda
tory an essential difference in approach-even though
similar elements are common. In our one world of man
and his environment there are undoubtedly religious
aspects. Out of the transient phenomena, therefore, man
can and does construct also a world of theology which, I
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believe, points symbolically to the God of nature. This
procedure may well involve extrascientific matters, even
metascientific principles. Here, again, I find no one-to-one
correspondence between the factitious world of theology,
created out of the changing world of phenomena (including
possibly revelations, i.e., insights) and the eternal world
of God, but once again an increasing likeness as a whole
is credible in view of the increasing understanding and
continuing value of spiritual experiences.
"Knowledge is power," but prior to knowledge there
is always creative faith that some knowledge is within the
grasp of man. "Credo ut intelligam" has been the guiding
light for all progress. "Now abide the faith, hope, love,
these three"-but the first of these is faith. For faith is
what physicists-indeed, all men-live by, the basis of any
"program for action." Perhaps beneath our confusing
verbiage there is latent considerable agreement as to
practice, and open disagreement only as to belief in the
theoretical meaning of the practical. Regardless of the
terminology, therefore, one might view these so-called
"metaphysical principles of science" as follows: (1) either
assumed before physics as an existent prefabricated mold0
(i.e., strictly extrascientific), regarded possibly as amor
phous science; 2 (2) or identified heuristically in the
behavioral sciences 2• (i.e., definitely extraphysical), be
lieved possibly crystallizing after physics to become sym
bolic pointers 7 to a world beyond our sensory experiences.
6

7
The Role of A Priori Elements
in Physical Theory
ADOLF GRUNBAUM

1. Introduction
I WISH first to examine critically the thesis that,
in a physical theory comprising a network of hypotheses,
any one component hypothesis can be preserved in the
face of seemingly contrary empirical findings as part of an
explanans of these very findings by making suitable com
pensatory modifications in the remaining body of the total
theory. This conception of the ingression of the a priori
into physical knowledge is, of course, not the Kantian one,
since it repudiates the latter's dichotomy between a priori
and a posteriori certifiability as a basis for classifying
individual principles of scientific theory. Instead, it claims
that there is a fundamental theoretical ambiguity of the
observational evidence which allows us, at a price, to
refuse to abandon any one component hypothesis that
we have thereby chosen for a priori espousal. This thesis
was advanced about fifty years ago by the physicist, histo
rian of physical thought, and philosopher of science
Pierre Duhem (1861-1916). 1
Duhem's argument was articulated and endorsed by
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Einstein a decade ago in regard to the epistemological
status of physical geometry. I therefore wish to inquire
into its validity in the context of geometry by giving a
critique of each of the following: ( 1) Einstein's geometrical
defense of the Duhemian ambiguity; and (2) Jacques
Maritain's allegation of the existence of a philosophical,
as distinct from scientific, escape from that ambiguity.
This inquiry bears not only on the role of the a priori
but also on the twin problem of the adequacy of physical
theory as a description of the external world. For, once
we shall have noted precisely the important distinction
between the quasi a priori choice of a physical geometry
in the sense of Duhem and the conventional adoption of
such a geometry in the sense of Poincare, we shall see the
following: so far as a geometry can be affirmed a priori in
the sense of Duhem, its characterization of the geometric
features of physical reality suffers from uncertainty in a
less mitigable sense than it does merely because it asserts
more than is entailed by its supporting evidence.
Duhem maintains that, just as there can be no crucial
verifying experiments, so also there can be no falsifying
(refuting) experiments for any particular hypothesis ingre
dient in a physical theory in isolation from the remaining
component hypotheses of that theory.2 His grounds are
that the logic of every disconfirmation no less than of
every confirmation is such as to involve the confrontation
with experience of an entire network of inextricably inter
woven hypotheses rather than the separate testing of any
one component hypothesis. The following symbolization
will serve to clarify the reasoning underlying Duhem's
contention. Let H represent the particular hypothesis to
be tested, and A the set of auxiliary or collateral assump
tions (laws, boundary conditions) integral to the deductive
linkage descending from H down to the entailed observa-
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tional findings F which might be presumed to support H
as such. Then, if the arrow, ➔• is the symbol for logical
entailment, and the dot, •, represents conjunction, we
have the following premise for an inductive, confirmatory
inference of H:
[(H•A) ➔ F]•F
But this premise not only precludes certainty as to the
truth of H but also makes clear that even such merely
inductive support as the evidence F does provide for a
theoretical inference is conferred not on H by itself but
only on the conjunction of H and the collateral assump
tions A of the theory.
An analogous inconclusiveness obtains, according to
Duhem, in regard to the refutation of an isolated hypothe
sis H upon the discovery of data O that may seem to be
highly unfavorable to H because they are logically in
compatible with the logical consequence F of H•A. I£ the
tilde, ~, is used as the symbol for negation, the premise
for the refutative inference that H is false is the following:
[(H•A) ➔ F]-

~F

It is evident that this premise entails not the falsity of H
by itself but only the weaker conclusion that H and A
cannot both be true. And now Duhem makes the follow
ing far-reaching claim: by allowing that H be true while
A is false, the observational findings O-whatever they may
be-always permit the theorist to preserve H as a part of
an explanans of O through a suitable modification of A,
such that the conjunction of Hand the now altered version
of the auxiliary assumptions does explain the set 0, which
is logically incompatible with F. In this significant sense,
then, Duhem claims, an a priori element does enter physical
theory, because the logical constraints imposed by the
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observational data are sufficiently flexible and ambiguous
theoretically to sanction a kind of a priori choice in regard
to the alternative of either unalterably retaining H or
abandoning it.
We shall refer to this logical situation as the "Duhemian
ambiguity" or "Duhemian alternative."
I have argued elsewhere in detail 3 that Duhem's asser
tion of the inevitable inconclusiveness of the falsifiability
of an isolated explanatory hypothesis Hof empirical science
is a non sequitur in the following sense: No general fea
tures of the logic of falsifiability can assure, for every
hypothesis H and independently of the domain to which
it pertains, that H can always be preserved as an essential
part of the explanans of any empirical findings O what
ever, provided that we rule out such trivial auxiliary
hypotheses as ~ H v O (where v is the symbol for the in
clusive "or"), which no scientist would deem explanatory.
For-to summarize my detailed argument-Duhem cannot
guarantee on any general logical grounds the deducibility
of O from an explanans constituted by the conjunction of
H and some nontrivial, revised version R of the original
· auxiliary assumptions A: the existence of the required
nontrivial set R of collateral assumptions must be demon
strated for each particular case.
Here I now wish to demonstrate geometrically that the
categorical form of Duhem's thesis is false. A critical
examination of Einstein's geometrical articulation of
Duhem's thesis will now show that (1) the testing of
physical geometry furnishes a counterexample to Duhem's
categorical claim of the inevitable inconclusiveness of the
falsifiability of part of an explanans, and (2) the valid
core of Duhem's thesis is the following much weaker
assertion: the logic of every disconfirmation, no less than
of every confirmation, of an isolated empirical hypothesis
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R is such as to involve at some stage or other an entire
network of interwoven hypotheses in which His ingredient
rather than the separate testing of the component H at
every stage.

2. Critique of Einstein's Duhemian Thesis
Physical geometry is usually conceived as the system of
metric relations exhibited by transported solid bodies in
dependently of their particular chemical composition. On
this conception, the criterion of congruence can be fur
nished by a transported solid body for the purpose of de
termining the geometry by measurement only if the
computational application of suitable "corrections" (or,
ideally, appropriate shielding) has assured rigidity in the
sense of essentially eliminating inhomogeneous thermal,
elastic, electromagnetic, and other perturbational influ
ences. For these influem:es are "deforming" in the sense of
producing changes of varying degree in different kinds of
materials. Since the existence of perturbational influences
thus issues in a dependence of the coincidence behavior of
transported solid rods on the rods' chemical composition,
and since physical geometry is concerned with the be
havior common to all solids apart from their substance
specific idiosyncrasies, the discounting of idiosyncratic
distortions is an essential aspect of the logic of physical
geometry. The demand for the computational elimination
of such distortions as a prerequisite to the experimental
determination of the geometry has a thermodynamic coun
terpart: the requirement of a means for measuring tem
perature which does not yield the discordant results
produced by expansion thermometers at other than fixed
points when different thermometric substances are em
ployed. This thermometric need is fulfilled successfully by
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Kelvin's thermodynamic scale of temperature. But atten
tion to the implementation of the corresponding prereq
uisite of physical geometry has led Einstein to impugn the
empirical status of that geometry. He considers the case in
which congruence has been defined by the diverse kinds of
transported solid measuring rods as corrected for their re
spective idiosyncratic distortions with a view to then mak
ing an empirical determination of the prevailing geometry.
And Einstein's thesis is that the very logic of computing
these corrections precludes that the geometry itself be ac
cessible to experimental ascertainment in isolation from
other physical regularities. Specifically, he states his case in
the form of a dialogue in which he attributes his own
Duhemian view to Poincare and opposes Reichenbach's
conception. But I submit that Poincare's text will not bear
Einstein's interpretation. For, in speaking of the variations
which solids exhibit under distorting influences, Poincare
says, "We neglect these variations in laying the foundations
of geometry, because, besides their being very slight, they
are irregular and consequently seem to us accidental." 4
. I am therefore taking the liberty of replacing Poincare in
Einstein's dialogue by Duhem and Einstein. With this mod
ification, the dialogue reads as follows: 5

Duhem and Einstein: The empirically given bodies are not
rigid, and consequently can not be used for the embodiment
of geometric intervals. Therefore, the theorems of geometry
are not verifiable.
Reichenbach: I admit that there are no bodies which can
be immediately adduced for the "real definition" [i.e., physical
definition] of the interval. Nevertheless, this real definition
can be achieved by taking the thermal volume-dependence,
elasticity, electro- and magneto-striction, etc., into considera
tion. That this is really and without contradiction possible,
classical physics has surely demonstrated.

ADOLF GRUNBAUM

115

Duhem and Einstein: In gaining the real definition improved
by yourself you have made use of physical laws, the formula
tion of which presupposes (in this case) Euclidean geometry.
The verification, of which you have spoken, refers, therefore,
not merely to geometry but to the entire system of physical
laws which constitute its foundation. An examination of geom
etry by itself is consequently not thinkable ....Why should
it consequently not be entirely up to me to choose geometry
according to my own convenience (i.e., Euclidean) and to fit
the remaining (in the usual sense "physical") laws to this
choice in such manner that there can arise no contradiction of
the whole with experience?

Einstein is making two major points here:
1. In obtaining a physical geometry by giving a physical
interpretation of the postulates of a formal geometric
axiom system, the specification of the physical meaning of
such theoretical terms as "congruent," "length," or "dis
tance" is not at all simply a matter of giving an operational
definition in the strict sense. Instead, what has been var
iously called a "correspondence rule" (Margenau and
Carnap), a "coordinative definition" (Reichenbach), an
"epistemic correlation" (Northrop), or a "dictionary" (N. R.
Campbell) is provided here through the mediation of hy
potheses· and laws which are collateral to the geometric
theory whose physical meaning is being specified. Einstein's
point that the physical meaning of congruence is given by
the transported rod as corrected theoretically for idiosyn
cratic distortions is an illuminating one and has an abun
dance of analogues throughout physical theory. Thus, in
the theory of the Michelson-Morley experiment, for exam
ple, statements about round-trip times are linked concep
tually to the readings of physical clocks via the sophisticated
optical theory of interferometry. And the inadequacy of
conceiving of all correspondence rules in physical theory
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as straightforward operational definitions is acknowledged
by Professor Margenau's avowal in his contributioff to this
symposium that operational definitions are merely one
species of correspondence rules. I would add that opera
tional definitions are a rather simplified and limiting spe
cies at that.
2. Einstein's second claim, which is the cardinal one for
our purposes, is that the role of collateral theory in the
physical definition of congruence is such as to issue in the
following circularity, from which there is no escape, he
maintains, short of acknowledging the existence of an a
priori element in the sense of the Duhemian ambiguity:
the rigid body is not even defined without first decreeing
the validity of Euclidean geometry (or of some other par
ticular geometry). For before the corrected rod can be used
to make an empirical determination of the de facto geom
etry, the required corrections must be computed via laws,
such as those of elasticity, which involve Euclideanly cal
culated areas and volumes. But clearly the warrant for thus
introducing Euclidean geometry at this stage cannot be
empirical.
If Einstein's Duhemian thesis were to prove correct, it
would have to be acknowledged that there is a sense in
which physical geometry itself does not provide a geomet
ric characterization of physical reality. For by this charac
terization we understand the articulation of the system of
relations obtaining between bodies and transported solid
rods quite apart from their substance-specific distortions.
And to the extent to which physical geometry is a priori
in the sense of the Duhemian ambiguity, there is an in
gression of a priori elements into physical theory to fill
distinctively geometric gaps in our knowledge of the phys
ical world.
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I now wish to set forth my doubts regarding the sound
ness of Einstein's contention.
There can be no question that the laws used to make the
corrections for deformations involve areas and volumes in
a fundamental way (e.g., in the definitions of the elastic
stresses and strains) and that this involvement presupposes
a geometry, as is evident from the area and volume formu
las of differential geometry, which contain the square root
of the determinant of the components g,1c of the metric
tensor. Now suppose that we begin with a set of Euclid
eanly formulated physical laws P0 in correcting for the dis
tortions induced by perturbations and then use the thus
Euclideanly corrected congruence standard for empirically
exploring the geometry of space by determining the metric
tensor. The initial stipulational affirmation of the Euclid
ean geometry G0 in the physical laws P0 used to compute
the corrections in no way assures that the geometry ob
tained by the corrected rods will be Euclidean! If it is non
Euclidean, then the question is: \Vhat will be involved in
Einstein's fitting of the physical laws to preserve Euclid
eanism and avoid a contradiction of the theoretical system
with experience? Will the adjustments in P0 necessitated
by the retention of Euclideanism entail merely a change in
the dependence of the length assigned to the transported
rod on such nonpositional parameters as temperature, pres
sure, magnetic field, etc.? Or could the putative empirical
findings compel that the length of the transported rod be
likewise made a nonconstant function of its position and
orientation as independent variables in order to square the
coincidence findings with the requirement of Euclidean
ism? The temporal variability of distorting influences and
the possibility of obtaining non-Euclidean results by meas
urements carried out in a spatial region uniformly char
acterized by standard conditions of temperature, pressure,
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electric and magnetic field strength, etc., show it to be quite
doubtful that the preservation of Euclideanism could al
ways be accomplished short of introducing the dependence
of the rod's length on the independent variables of position
and orientation. Thus, in order to retain Euclideanism, it
may be necessary to remetrize entirely apart from any con
sideration of idiosyncratic distortions and even after cor
recting for these in some way or other. But this kind of
remetrization, though entirely admissible in other con
texts, does not provide the requfaite support for Einstein's
Duhemian thesis. For it is the avowed onus of that thesis
to show that the geometry by itself cannot be held to be
empirical even when, with Reichenbach, we have sought
to assure its empirical character by choosing and then ad
hering to the customary (standard) definition of congru
ence, which excludes resorting to such remetrization.
It is precisely such remetrization which Poincare invoked
as a basis for his claim that, if the customary definition of
congruence on the basis of the coincidence behavior com
mon to all kinds of solid rods does not assure a Euclidean
description of the facts, then such a description can be
guaranteed remetrizationally, i.e., by merely choosing an
appropriately different noncustomary congruence defini
tion which makes the length of a solid rod a specified
nonconstant function of the independent variables of posi
tion and orientation.
By resting the possibility of giving either a Euclidean or
a non-Euclidean description of the same spatiophysical
facts on alternative metrizability in this sense, Poincare is
thus not at all invoking the alleged inductive ambiguity
which the Duhemian claims to prevail even when congru
ence is defined in the customary fashion by a standard rod
for whose idiosyncratic deformations allowance has been
made computationally. For Poincare tells us that, quite
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apart from any considerations of distorting influences and
even after correcting for these in some way or other, we are
at liberty to define congruence-and thereby to fix the asso
ciated geometry appropriate to the given facts-either by
calling a solid rod equal to itself everywhere or by making
its length vary in a specified way with its position or orien
tation. Thus understood, Poincare's conventionalist con
ception of geometry is aprioristic in an innocuous sense.6
By contrast, we shall now see that, in the context of his
assumptions, the Duhemian cannot guarantee an a priori
choice of a particular geometry from a set S of alternative
geometries, since there is an important class of conditions
under which the membership of his set S would be just one
unique geometry!
That the geometry by itself may well be empirical, con
trary to Duhem and Einstein, once we have renounced the
kinds of alternative congruence definitions employed by
Poincare, is seen from the following possibilities of its suc
cessful empirical determination. After assumedly obtaining
a non-Euclidean geometry G1 from measurements with a
rod corrected on the basis of Euclideanly formulated phys
ical laws Po, we can revise P0 so as to conform to the non
Euclidean geometry G1 just obtained by measurement.
This retroactive revision of P0 would be effected by recal
culating such quantities as areas and volumes on the basis
of G1 and changing the functional dependencies relating
them to temperature and other physical parameters. \Ve
thus obtain a new set of physical laws P1 • Now we use this
set P1 of laws to correct the rods for perturbational influ
ences and then determine the geometry with the thus-cor
rected rods. If the result is a geometry G2 different from
Gi, then, if there is convergence to a geometry of constant
curvature upon repeating this process several more times,
we must continue to repeat it an additional finite number
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of times until the geometry G,. ingredient in the laws Pn
providing the basis for perturbation corrections is . indeed
the same as the geometry obtained by measurements with
rods that have been corrected via the set P,.. If there is such
convergence at all, it will be to the same geometry G,. even
if the physical laws used in making the initial corrections
are not the set P0, which presupposes Euclidean geometry,
but a different set P based on some non-Euclidean geom
etry or other. That there can exist only one such geometry
of constant curvature G,. would seem to be guaranteed by
the identity of G,. with the uniqui underlying geometry
Gt characterized by the following properties: (l) Gt would
be exhibited by the coincidence behavior of a transported
rod if the whole of the space were actually free of deform
ing influences; (2) Gt would be obtained by measurements
with rods corrected for distortions on the basis of physical
laws Pt presupposing G 1; and (3) Gt would be found to
prevail in a given relatively small, perturbation-free region
of the space quite independently of the assumed geometry
ingredient in the correctional physical laws. Hence, if our
method of successive approximation does converge to a
geometry G,. of constant curvature, then G.. would be this
unique underlying geometry Gt . And, in that event, we
can claim to have found empirically that Gt is indeed the
geometry prevailing in the entire space which we have ex
plored.
But what if there is no convergence? It might happen
that, whereas convergence would obtain by starting out
with corrections based on the set Po of physical laws, it
would not obtain by beginning instead with corrections
presupposing some particular non-Euclidean set P, or vice
versa: just as in the case of Newton's method of successive
approximation, there are conditions, as Mr. A. Suna has
pointed out to me, under which there would be no con-
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vergence. We might then nonetheless succeed as follows in
finding the geometry Gt empirically, if our space is one of
constant curvature.
The geometry G, resulting from measurements by means
of a corrected rod is a single-valued function of the geom
etry Ga assumed in the correctional physical laws, and a
Laplacian demon having sufficient knowledge of the facts
of the world would know this function G, = f(Ga)• Accord
ingly, we can formulate the problem of determining the
geometry empirically as the problem of finding the point
of intersection between the curve representing this func
tion and the straight line G, = Ga, That there exists one
and only one such point of intersection follows from the
existence of the geometry G t defined above, provided that
our space is one of constant curvature. Thus, what is now
needed is to make determinations of the G, corresponding
to a number of geometrically different sets of correctional
physical laws Pa, to draw the most reasonable curve
Gr = f(Ga) through this finite number of points (Ga, Gr),
and then to find the point of intersection of this curve and
the straight line Gr = Ga.
'\Vhether this point of intersection turns out to be the
one representing Euclidean geometry or not is beyond the
reach of our conventions, barring a remetrization. And
thus the least that we can conclude is that, since empirical
findings can greatly narrow down the range of uncertainty
as to the prevailing geometry, there is no assurance of the
latitude for the choice of a geometry which Einstein takes
for granted. Einstein's Duhemian position would appear
to be inescapable only if our proposed method of determin
ing the geometry by itself empirically cannot be generalized
in some way to cover the general relativity case of a space
of variable curvature (in which the geometry cannot be
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specified by a single scalar like the Gaussian curvature) and
if the latter kind of theory turns out to be true.
3. Duhem's Thesis and]. Maritain's Philosophy
of Geometry
If my proposed method of escaping from the web of the
Duhemian ambiguity were shown to be unsuccessful, and
if there should happen to be no other scientifically viable
means of escape, then, it seems to me, we would unflinch
ingly have to resign ourselves to this relatively unmit
igable type of uncertainty. No, says the philosopher Jacques
Maritain, who enticingly beckons us to take heart. The
scientific elusiveness of the correct geometric description
of external reality must not lead us to suppose, he tells us,
that philosophy, when divorced from mathematical physics,
cannot rescue us from the labyrinth of the Duhemian per
plexity and unveil for us the structure of what he calls "ens
geometricum reale" (real geometrical being). 7 As against
Maritain's conception of the capabilities of philosophy as
an avenue of cognition, I wish to uphold the following
excellent declaration by Professor Bridgman, which he gave
in his paper for the present symposium: "The physicist
emphatically would not say that his knowledge presump
tively will not lead to a full understanding of reality for
the reason that there are other kinds of knowledge than
the knowledge in which he deals." 8 To justify my endorse
ment of Professor Bridgman's statement in this context,
I shall give a brief critique of Maritain's philosophy of
geometry as presented in his book The Degrees of Knowl
edge.9
I have selected Maritain's views for rebuttal because they
typify the conception of those who believe that the philos
opher as such has at his disposal means for fathoming the
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structure of external reality which are not available to the
scientist. In outline, Maritain endeavors to justify this idea
in regard to geometry along the following lines. Says he:
"There is no clearer word than the word reality, which
means that which is. ...What is meant when it is asked
whether real space is euclidean or non-euclidean ... ?" 10
To prepare for his answer to this question, he explains the
following: "The word real has not the same meaning for
the philosopher, the mathematician and the physicist.11
... For the physicist a space is 'real' when the geometry
to which it corresponds permits of the construction of a
physico-mathematical universe which coherently and com
pletely symbolizes physical phenomena, and where all our
graduated readings find themselves 'explained.' And it is
obvious that from this point of view no space of any kind
holds any sort of privileged position. 12 But ...the ques
tion is to know what is real space in the philosophical
meaning of the word, i.e., as a 'real' entity ...designating
an object of thought capable of an extra-mental exist
ence.... " 13 One is immediately puzzled as to how Mari
tain conceives that his distinction between physically real
space and the philosophically real space which is avowedly
extra-mental is not an empty distinction without a differ
ence. And, instead of being resolved, this puzzlement only
deepens when he tells us that by the extra-mental geometric
features of existing bodies he understands "those properties
which the mind recognizes in the elimination of all the
physical." 14 But let us suspend judgment concerning this
difficulty and see whether it is not cleared up by his treat
ment of the following question posed 15 by him: How are
we to know whether it is Euclidean geometry or one of the
non-Euclidean geometries that represents the structure of
the philosophically real, i.e., extra-mental or external
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space? In regard to this question, he makes the following
assertions:
I. The capabilities of physical measurements to yield
the answer to the question are nil,16 because a geometry is
presupposed in the theory of our measuring instruments
which forms the basis of corrections for "accessory varia
tions due to various physical circumstances." 17 Of course,
we recognize this contention to be a strong form of the
Duhemian one, although Maritain does not refer to
Duhem.
2. The several non-Euclidean geometries depend for
their consistency on their formal translatability into Eu
clidean geometry. This translation is effected by providing
a Euclidean model of the particular non-Euclidean geom
etry in the sense of embedding an appropriately curved
non-Euclidean surface in the three-dimensional Euclidean
space. And the privileged position which Euclidean geom
etry enjoys as the underwriter of the consistency of the
non-Euclidean geometries thus issues in a correlative de
pendence of the intuitability of the non-Euclidean geom
etries on the primary intuitability of the Euclideanism of
·the embedding three-dimensional hyperspace. 18
Using the twin arguments from consistency and intui
tability, Maritain then reaches the following final conclu
sion: "The non-Euclidean spaces can then without the
least intrinsic contradiction be the object of consideration
by the mind, but there would be a contradiction in sup
posing their existence outside the mind, and thereby sup
pressing, for their benefit, the existence of the foundation
on which the notion of them is based.
"Either way we are thus led to admit, despite the use
which astronomy makes of them, that these non-euclidean
spaces are rational [i.e., purely mental] beings; and that the
geometric properties of existing bodies, those properties
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which the mind recognizes in the elimination of all the
physical, are those which characterize euclidean space. For
philosophy it is euclidean space which appears as an ens
geometricum reale." 19
I submit that Maritain's thesis is unsound in its entirety
and can be completely refuted as follows.
First, as Hilbert and Bernays have explained, 20 the con•
sistency of the Euclidean axiom system is not vouchsafed
by its intuitive plausibility as an adequate description of
the space of our immediate physical environment. Instead,
we establish the consistency of Euclidean geometry by pro•
viding a model of the formal Euclidean postulates in the
domain of real numbers in the manner of analytic geom
etry.21 Now, Maritain overlooks that precisely the same
procedure of providing a real number model can be used
to establish the internal consistency of the various non
Euclidean geometries without the mediation of a prior
translation into Euclidean geometry (except possibly in
an irrelevant heuristic sense). And he is misled by the fact
that, historically, the consistency of the several non-Euclid
ean geometries was established by means of a translation
into Euclidean geometry, as for example in Klein's relative
consistency proof of hyperbolic geometry via a model fur
nished by the interior of a circle in the Euclidean plane.
For surely the temporal priority of Euclidean geometry
inherent in the historical circumstances of our discovery
of the internal consistency of the various non-Euclidean
geometries hardly serves to establish the logical primacy
of Euclidean geometry as the sole guarantee of their con
sistency. And Maritain's error on this count is only com
pounded by his intuitability argument for the uniqueness
of Euclideanism as the only possible structure of extra
mental reality. The latter argument is vitiated by the in
veterate error of being victimized by the misleading
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connotation of embedding in a Euclidean hyperspace,
which is possessed by the terms "curved space" and "curva
ture of a surface." This connotation springs from unaware
ness that the Gaussian curvature of a 2-space and the
Riemannian curvatures for the various orientations at
points of a 3-space are intrinsically definable and discern
ible properties of these spaces, requiring no embedding.
Moreover, Maritain overlooks here that even when the
consistency proof of hyperbolic geometry, for example, is
given on the basis of Euclidean geometry-which we saw
is quite unnecessary-this can be accomplished without em
bedding, as in the case of the aforementioned two-dimen
sional Klein model, just as readily as by Beltrami's
procedure of embedding a surface of constant negative
Gaussian curvature (containing singular lines) in Euclid
ean 3-space.
Lastly, it can surely not be maintained that "the geo
metric properties of existing bodies" are "those properties
which the mind recognizes in the elimination of all the
physical." For, in that case, geometry would be the study
of purely imagined thought-objects, which will, of course,
turn out to have Euclidean properties, if Maritain's imag
ination thus endows them. And the geometry of such an
imagined space could then not qualify as the geometry of
Maritain's real or extra-mental space. The geometric theory
of external reality does indeed abstract from a large class
of physical properties in the sense of being the metrical
study of the coincidence behavior of transported solids in
dependently of the solids' substance-specific physical prop
erties. But this kind of abstracting does not deprive metrical
coincidence behavior of its physicality. And if the methods
of the physicist cannot fathom the laws of that behavior,
then certainly no other kind of intellectual endeavor will
succeed in doing so.
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4. Remarks on the Contributions by Margenau and
Bridgman
Professor Margenau's intersubjectivity or communality
of evidence as a controlling factor of scientific method is a
safeguard whose reasonableness derives from the mutuality
of accreditation obtaining between theory and evidence in
virtue of the interpenetration of the criteria of credibility
which certify evidence as bona fide, on the one hand, and
theory as evidentially warranted on the other. This inter
penetration enters into the scientific assessment of the
credibility of reports of nonrepeatable kinds of experiences.
The authenticity of the claims of such isolated kinds of
experiences is made no less dependent on the latter's con
formity to previous theory than evidence, in turn, is used
to decide on the acceptability of a theory. Thus, loosely
speaking, not only is evidence used to confirm a theory, but
theory is invoked to certify reports of observations as verid
ical. And, in this sense, the quasi a priori lurks in the twi
light of the fuzzy boundary between the evidence and its
interpretation, between the observation terms and the
theoretical terms of the language of physics. To cite but
one example from the recent history of physics, one need
only recall that, even before Shankland and his associates
denied the adequacy of D. C. Miller's controls in his runs
of the Michelson-Morley experiment, 22 many if not most
physicists refused to give credence to Miller's claims. .,c\nd
their grounds for believing that Miller's findings could not
have been obtained under the conditions claimed by him
were none other than their quasi a priori theoretical sup
position that the site of the Case Institute of Technology
is not a terrestrial singularity.
In this same vein, it seems to me, one can reasonably
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reply to Professor Bridgman's challenge that we justify
our confidence in our being awake rather than dreaming
at certain times. If asked on what grounds I believe to be
awake at the present time while talking, for example, I
would answer not, as Hume did, that veridical perception
is more vivid than dream experience but rather that the
conformity of the structure of my present experiences to a
large body of independently confirmed theory justifies my
belief that they are waking experiences. And I would add
that such conformity does not obtain in the case of dream
experiences.

8
Discussion

*

Question by Dr. Hanson of the University of Minnesota:
Professor Margenau, I'd like to pose one question to Pro
fessor Lande. Since he knows that I ascribe to the Copen
hagen interpretation perhaps more enthusiastically than
is good for me, perhaps I may put it somewhat rhetorically.
The point is this: Lande is perfectly right in saying that
there is a sense in which, for example, if an accident took
place on the road I could kick in its direction, but I could
not kick at the probability amplitude of the density of ac
cidents on Sunday. That is perfectly true. But, on the other
hand, there is something, for example, in the beta-ray ex
periment, the diffraction patterns there, which seems to be
perfectly kickable at, in exactly the same way that we were
able to use the fact of periodic distributions in the Laue
experiments on x-rays to settle that there was something
wavelike there. I think we are perfectly correct in taking
seriously the fact that in the Davisson-Germer experiments
and in the G. P. Thomson work there was something that
had to be taken seriously; to identify this kind of distribu• Transcribed from a tape recording.
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tion with the sort of distribution that we have of the den
sity of accidents on a Sunday seems to me a bit quick and
I felt unhappy about it. It is also worth while noting, I
think, that the 1923 paper by Duane that he mentions cer
tainly points out that this was not very carefully read by
most physicists. If what the 1923 paper asserts is true, the
consequences throughout the whole history of our under
standing of physics are going to be serious indeed. It is
just like the 1925-1926 papers by J. J. Thomson, in which,
for example, he tries to explain the Compton effect in
terms of a pure wave theory (radiation pressure, etc.,
which is wholly qualitative); it is perfectly clear that no
one has ever read them-not seriously, and if he was cor
rect there would be, you might say, an ante-Lande and an
ante-Born approach to the whole problem, and I was just
wondering how he would react to either of these possi
bilities.
Lande: My comment is that, to adhere to the dualistic
theory in which neither waves nor particles are real, nor
quite unreal, is a complicated point of view, and as I
said, the enormous literature produced day after day in
order to make this duality more palatable may be a sign
that basically we are not satisfied with it. We want to have
a unitary theory; and (if I may use the word) even after
thirty years of persuasion we still want a unitary theory.
In fact, Born thirty years ago proposed the beginnings of
a unitary theory in which even the diffraction experiments
with maxima and minima, which look so very wavelike,
still are interpreted in the same unitary way, as confirmed
by the statistical build-up of the diffraction patterns.
According to the duality, or let us say according to the
original opinion, all these were "quantum miracles." The
electrons seem to misbehave. They ought to behave ac
cording to the rules of classical mechanics but they
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simply, very strangely, obey wave laws. This obeying of
wave laws has been codified and raised to an article of
faith for the last thirty years. I think that as long as we be
lieve that electrons misbehave we do not understand. But
I think we could make this misbehavior, these miracles,
understood by going a little deeper into the formal back
ground of the interference law and the periodicity law.
Both are, in my opinion, quite natural and simple, and
have to be so according to what I said before.
The Chairman invited further questions and comments
from the floor.
Saul A. Basri: It seems to me that as human beings the
only things we can be sure of are our sensations and
thoughts, and that because of this we assume that our sen
sations are due to things outside us which we call the
macroscopic world. In other words, the existence of the
macroscopic world is an assumption to explain our sensa
tions, perhaps to put order into our sensations; and that
the microscopic world is another assumption of the same
kind. In other words, we assume the existence of electrons
in order to explain the properties of the macroscopic world
which we assume exist to explain our sensations. It is this
which I wonder whether you, Professor Margenau, or Pro
fessor Bridgman or Professor Lande would like to com
ment on.
Chairman: Professor Bridgman?
Bridgman: I never use the word "reality"; I was just
talking about the way I thought other people used it.
Basri: But would you agree with that view, or would
you disagree?
Bridgman: Would I agree that other people say that
things are real?
Basri: No, with this particular view of looking at physi
cal reality through the macroscopic and microscopic world.
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Bridgman: Well, I say I don't use the word. You can
get along without it.
Basri: Would you say this is what you understand by the
microscopic world?
Bridgman: Yes, I think the microscopic world has to
have its explanation. Your language about the microscopic
world is ultimately reducible to the language you used to
describe the macroscopic world.
Margenau: Since I was included in this interrogation,
may I say briefly what my view of reality is. I agree with
Professor Bridgman that the term is obnoxious, that it
has a great variety of meanings and causes a great deal of
confusion in the minds of people, including physicists.
One might therefore be well advised to shun its use. How
ever, it seems to me that, if people 300 years ago, physi
cists 300 years ago, had decided not to use the word "force,"
which was as vague as is the word reality today, physics
might not have developed as rapidly, as consistently, as
it has.
There are two ways in which the difficulties arising from
the diffusive usage can be remedied. One is to prohibit
the use of a diffuse term. The other way is to make it more
precise. This is indeed what happened to the terms "force,"
"energy," "momentum," which now beneficently infest the
realm of physics. I don't believe that we should now have
any objection to their use, because they have been refined,
because they have been made definite. What I propose is
to make the meaning of the term "reality" equally definite.
Let me now turn to the question of the interrogator.
Yes, indeed, the role of theoretical physics may be regarded
as an artifact to make what I would like to call sensory
reality meaningful; to make sense impressions, observa
tions, and so forth, coherent; to bestow upon them a
degree of organization, of cohesion, of lucidity which they
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in themselves do not possess. We do this, I think, not so
much by a direct appeal to the ontological existence of an
external world, microscopic or macroscopic. To be sure,
there are many who pursue that course. But this is not
necessary in science. We can, in a sense, following Kant,
investigate the processes by which we do reach trans
subjective certainty.
The process, as I see it, is something like this. One
matches the immediate experiences against a realm of ra
tional common sense. One establishes rules of correspond
ence between the immediately perceived flash of light and
the construct light which is well known to the theoretical
physicist, the construct which involves the idea of electro
magnetic fields, and so forth. One sets up a correspondence
between this immediate experience and these constructs.
Now the constructs are so chosen in the first place that
they make for what I call metaphysical satisfaction. They
must satisfy economy of thought; they must be logically
fertile; they must lead to consequences which can be ob
served. This is one set of requirements to which the so
called constructs may be subjected, must be subjected.
This set of requirements, in contradiction to an under
standing which had arisen in Dr. Seeger's mind, is not ab
solutely fixed. I think I said in my own talk, and I have
written, that they are pragmatic devices, although I chose
to call them metaphysical. Metaphysics can be pragmatic,
can be tentative, and all that.
We impose upon our constructs these rules; then we see
whether they agree through their deductions with empiri
cal observations. So there are two classes of requirements:
those called methodological or metaphysical, and those
called empirical. When both are met we declare: what was
originally merely a construct has now become what I
have termed a verifact. At this point, since I was asked,
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"What is physical reality?" I would answer, the verifacts
of the physical sciences. This is to me the most satisfactory
way of stabilizing, of refining, the concept of physical
reality.
Bridgman: May I ask one question? Is this reality which
you describe this way unique?
Margenau: If you mean unique in the sense of categor
ical, clearly distinct from everything else, my answer is no.
There is nothing in human experience that can be said
to be unique, distinct, and valid in a self-declaratory sense.
I would apply this even to the laws of logic. Certainly there
are no pigeonholes in human experience. In other words,
the concept of reality, or physical reality, which I have
evolved in so inadequate and brief a fashion, is not one
that allows you to confer the judgment, "This is real,''
"This is not real," upon all entities that interest the
physical scientist. There are shadings. There are instances
in which we are not willing to say, "This is real, and this
is not."
Many of these instances are of no interest whatever. I
suppose most of us would be willing to concede that
electrons are real. When you come to the mass of an
electron, would you say it is real? \\Tell, you might say,
yes it is, but in a sense it is not. Are qualities real? Are
attributes real? Are they real in the same sense as what
Aristotle called substances, and what we now call physical
systems (electrons, atoms, stars)? Such questions are to me
uninteresting, and I should not wish to answer them
except by statutory definition. In a sense, then, physical
reality is not unique.
However, it seems to me that if an approach like the
one outlined were employed, the term "reality," the con
cept of reality, might gradually, progressively, attain a
measure of precision if not uniqueness which is going to
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help the scientist, especially in his relations to the phi
losopher. It is my conviction that what the physicist
ought to do is to try to refine his terms, endeavoring to
make the philosopher see what he is doing, to adjust his
own language to philosophic language, rather than slam
the door upon the philosopher, rather than setting up
an iron curtain and establishing one more specialty in the
large domain of human concerns. And I think that by
trying to make things more precise, by trying to show the
philosopher what the physicist means by his terms, and,
reciprocally, by inducing in the physicist an attitude which
inclines him to listen with attention and understanding to
what the philosopher is saying, we are going to bridge
one of the deep crevasses that divides and bifurcates our
culture.
John Forwalter: It seems to me that if we had an able
semanticist present he might resolve our phenomenological
problem somewhat. Professor Bridgman, of course, does
so in terms of symbol and reality. However, much of the
discussion seems to be a denial on the physicists' part
that there is a reality. Perhaps this was accidental and can
be cleared away easily. Really, the framework for clearing
it away is present in many of the papers, such as that a
distinction between microscopic and macroscopic leads us
on to the notion that reality is in many levels or, if you
prefer, seen through the eyes of many disciplines, and
with the proper instruments we work within one of these
levels. But the distinction a semanticist might make would
be to warn us when we are talking about interpretive
matters and when we are talking about, let us say, the
data that we get from our instruments. The scientist would
take the data, he would find some relationships among
them-this is an old-fashioned way of looking at science,
I recognize-he would make some constructs, he would
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relate them to a general network of knowledge, and then
he would apply various tests, and I think a logician might
have found that our tests for scientific truths were not
all-encompassing; and then the scientist would end it
here. Perhaps this is far enough to go with it. Even our
philosophers present did not seem to go beyond to a
necessary relationship between the facts as physics finds
them, or the interpretations it puts upon them, and an
older way of looking at reality. If comment is necessary
it should be-I should like to have it-along the lines of
making some of these distinctions or of emphasizing the
over-all approach of science in terms of various levels of
knowledge.
Margenau: I believe there were no specific questions
here; I thought the remarks very illuminating and inter
esting.
Question from the floor (name not available): I should
like to comment on Professor Collingwood's paper. I think
he was trying to say that in addition to the primarily
quantitative structure of physics there is a kind of quali
tative knowledge, and so the question is this-in addition
to the general principles that you have discussed as physi
cists that grew beyond the proper body of physics itself,
do they not also assume a knowledge of things and com
mon-sense use of these words which is also outside of the
general volume of physics? If they do not make this assump
tion they would not be able to claim that they are using
the same measuring rods on two different occasions when
they are moving from place to place.
Margenau: I think there are two questions being asked.
One is, must the scientist distinguish between quantitative
and qualitative aspects of science? Must he acknowledge
the necessity of qualitative judgments? The second ques
tion is, are there not certain peculiar qualitative things
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assumed even in physical science-things like the entities
to which we assign quantitative properties? Am I stating
your questions correctly, sir?
Questioner: Well, I think that if the physicist did not
make this kind of assumption-would he know how to
find and recognize ordinary common-sense things?
Margenau: There has to be a certain degree of, shall I
say, substantiality, a certain degree of permanence in the
systems to which the scientist ascribes measurable quanti
ties. Now, with respect to the latter question, I would
answer as follows: Yes, indeed, there is an Aristotelian
hangover even in modern quantum physics. Because we
still acknowledge the existence of electrons; the existence
of neutrinos; the existence of what we generically call
systems, although they are not directly sensible. The
modern term system is the counterpart of Aristotelian
substance; and the modern term quantity is the counter
part of the Aristotelian accidents. I wonder here if Mr.
Collingwood would agree with me.
Collingwood: Quantity means the same in both con
texts, I think.
Margenau: I would suppose that in every stage of science
a distinction between quantitative and qualitative attri
butes of things is necessary. ,ve never get around it. How
ever, as I read the history of science I seem to observe a
progressive elimination of qualities in favor of quantities.
Qualities are supposed to be elusive things, incapable of
being approached, at any rate captured, by an application
of scientific methods.
Let me give you an example of what I have in mind.
Some fifty years ago, color was one of these esoteric quali
ties that could not be measured, and the reason was this:
people stated the attributes of color, defined color, in terms
of two observables, or "quantities," if you please. One was
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hue-wavelength; and the other was intensity. Now it is
true that an artist could paint two canvases in blue, both
having the same intensity and hue; and yet the two blues
would look different to the eye of the observer.
Here then arose the claim that color is a quality, some
thing that escapes the net of the scientist; something that
is esoteric, that is really not tractable by the methods of
science. Now what has happened is this: someone dis
covered that there is a further quantity, a third observable,
involved in this business, an observable called saturation.
Now if you paint two canvases in blue in such a way that
they agree with respect to hue, intensity, and saturation,
they also look alike. And so you have here the conversion
of what was at one time called a quality, not tractable by
the methods of science, into a scientific quantity capable
of numerical quantification. And it seems to me that this
process is going on forever. \Ve cannot say that everything
in the world that we regard as a quality will some day be
converted into a quantity. This is a question of faith
not one of the maxims, metaphysical or ·otherwise, of
science. I myself believe that this process of conversion of
qualities into quantities is going on as long as the human
mind inquires.
Grilnbaum: I just wanted to remark-I thought I de
tected in Professor Collingwood's paper and also in the
discussion something to the effect that quantifiability in
the usual sense of metrizability is a necessary condition
for scientific tractability. Now surely this is not so. After
all, there are topological problems, for example. in general
relativity theory, which are as scientific as other problems,
and they are certainly not quantitative problems in the
usual sense. So it seems to me somewhat dangerous to
concede first of all that mathematics is the science of
quantity; I think the domain of mathematics had better be
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left undefined because it is an elastically conceived domain
which changes. And I think it is also pregnant with mis
leading potentialities to talk about scientific tractability
in terms of quantifiability in the sense of metrical scales
of measurement. Conceptual circumscribability, axiomat
izability, articulatability are at least some of the crucial
requirements for scientific tractability; not necessarily, it
seems to me, quantifiability in the sense of scales of
measurement.
Margenau: I quite agree. One must not take the term
quantification in too literal and arithmetical a sense. How
ever, I think it might be maintained that even topology
is based on measurability and on numbers. I chose the
term quantifiability, quantification in a larger sense; but
it is certainly important to point out as Dr. Grilnbaum has
done that science at all stages does deal with qualities in
the sense of noncontinuous, nonquantifiable, nonarith
metical entities.
Question from floor (name not available): Professor
Margenau, would you care to comment on Professor
Seeger's remark that your deductive method is simply
tautological? You cannot get anything new. So, what do
you think about the axiomatic method?
Margenau: May I say that I agree with almost every
contention made by Dr. Seeger, but I do not agree with
his reading of my arguments. As a matter of fact, I hoped
it would be explicit that I do not rely solely upon the
axiomatic method. The use of the axiomatic method
amounts to this: one starts with postulates-these postulates
are part of the axiomatic system. From these axioms one
derives theorems, as many as possible; one wishes to exploit
fully the logical contents of the axioms. So one spins out
these theorems. These theorems are then related to what
one might call empirical nature or perceptory nature, by
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certain correspondence rules, epistemic correlations which
link, for example, the point in the mathematician's ·sense
with the dot of chalk on the blackboard, the force in the
sense of Newton's law with the force which Professor
Lande experiences when he kicks an object. These are
not the same entities logically; they are correlated by these
rules of correspondence.
Now what the axiomatic method achieves is this: it
makes quite explicit everything that is contained within
the postulates at the start of the scientific system. It does
not make them true. Reliance on the results of this analytic
process of spinning out from postulates what they contain
logically will never confirm, will never establish empirical
truth. It will establish internal consistency. Now of course
errors in science are of various kinds. One can easily go
wrong in mistaking an observation, making an error in a
reading. One can also go wrong in misreading the impli
cations of an axiomatic system. Now the latter kind of
error is avoided by an effort on the part of scientists to set
up an axiomatic scheme for every science. When that axio. matic scheme is at hand, one can see whether the results
it yields are in agreement with observations. Then comes
the matter of empirical confinnation, validation; and
when you have both these things, namely the axiomatic
scheme providing facilities for deductive procedure to
gether with the empirical, the inductive pursuit which
starts at the other end of the range of our experience, then
you have what, not I, but everybody in science, calls an
exact science. We distinguish exact sciences from cor
relational, or inexact, or descriptive sciences. This is a
technical term which I use. That does not mean that
that kind of science is necessarily more exact because it
uses axioms. It is more exact logically, yes. But it may be

DISCUSSION

141

wrong. Exactness in this sense does not imply correctness.
I wonder if I have answered your question, sir.
Questioner: You say that the deductive method could
then be used to get further results; but it gives nothing
new, for no new knowledge is accumulated.
Margenau: This depends upon what you mean by
"nothing new." If you mean nothing nonanalytic, nothing
synthetic, can come out of it, then of course I should
agree. But, you know, new things do emerge analytically
sometimes. Look at the theory of numbers. The finding of
all the prime numbers is a purely analytic pursuit. But
there's a lot of novelty in finding the million and seventh
prime number. \Ve must not confuse here novelty with
analyticity. If you mean analyticity, then what you say is
in my opinion correct. But if you mean novelty in the
manner of surprise, of unexpectedness, in the manner of
not having been able to predict it simply, then of course
the analytic process, the deductive process, can lead to
novelty. You may have a nasty differential equation which
may take years to solve; and some day a mathematician
succeeds in finding its solution. What he has done is to
establish an a1.-alytic consequence of the differential equa
tion according to its boundary conditions, or initial condi
tions, and so forth. And yet there is a great deal of novelty
in that solution.
Griinbaum: Contrary to Jeans, God is not a pure mathe
matician-that is the one thing He is utterly bored by.
Jeans said that God is a pure mathematician. \Vhat I am
trying to say is, since God would presumably see all the
implications of any postulate system, He would not be
spending His time proving theorems.
[Question from floor (not intelligible in the recording).J
Margenau: Professor Bridgman has been accused by the
questioner of having said somewhere that all knowledge.
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mathematical and otherwise, is ultimately empirical, that
geometry is a branch of physics. Professor Bridgman has
been asked to reply.
Bridgman: I never said that. I certainly recognize two
kinds of geometry. There is a geometry of postulates, and
a geometry of physical measurement.
Questioner: I still do not understand that Professor
Margenau could believe that something could be derived
from a set of axioms that is not already known.
Margenau: I am being accused of inconsistency in claim
ing that by using analytic procedures, that is, by deductive
procedures, one can deduce something, one can obtain
something, that is not already known. Now this is so easy
an allegation to come back at that I fear I must have
misunderstood the point of the question. Let me give you,
very briefly, the example I chose before-a differential
equation has solutions, and these solutions certainly are
not known in the beginning. The process of solving the
differential equation is often not a cut-and-dried affair, it
often relies on human ingenuity; there may be no general
rules for doing this. The process of solving this equation
. certainly has all the aspects of originality, and the results
have all the earmarks of novelty. And certainly the solution
of the differential equation is not known in the beginning.
It is implied logically, yes. But it is not known. This is
the simple remark I would make in answer to your ques
tion, but forgive me if I misunderstood it.

Notes
2. ls "Physical Knowledge" Limited by Its Quantitative
Approach to Reality?
FRANK J. COLLINGWOOD

L For other interpretations, cf. B. L. Van Der Waerden, Science Awak
ening, p. 125; and O. Neugebauer, The Exact Sciences in Antiquity, pp.
143-144.
2. In the famous illustration by means of the divided line Plato gives
in a very concise form his view of t he role that mathematia can play in
advancing human knowledge of the truth. The line is divided once into
two segments, one representing visible things, the other representing
intelligible things. The first segment is then divided into two parts, one
representing mere images such as shadows and reflections on water, the
other representing trees, animals, and artifacts which are the models of the
images. The segment representing intelligible things is divided into two
parts, the first of which represents the realm which the soul investigates
by treating as images the things represented in the second part of the
segment representing visible things. This realm is the one in which the
mathematician exercises his ingenuity. He makes use of visible forms and
talks about them, but in truth he is thinking of the mathematicals of
which the visible forms are but a likeness. "And do you know also that
although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they
are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of
the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute
diameter, and so on • • • the forms which they draw or make, and
which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted
by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things
14!1
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themselves which can only be seen with the eye of the mind." Republic,
VI, 510 C ff.
3. Republic, VII. 525 B-C and 526 A-C.
4. Republic, VII, 522 C E
- and 526 D. Republic, VII, 531 C. But he
complains that these musicians fail to "ascend to generalized problems
and the consideration of which numbers are inherently concordant and
which not, and why in each case." Thus he criticizes them for failing
to penetrate to the basic principles of number.
5. Republic, VII, 522 C.
6. "It is by means of problems, then," said I, "as in the study of
geometry, that we will pursue astronomy too, and we will let be the
things in the heavens, if we are to have a part in the true science of
astronomy and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural
indwelling intelligence of the soul." Republic, VII, 530 C. Cf. the imme
diately preceding part of the text for the censure of the astronomers
of his time. Cf. the last part of the text in note 8 below, where the
abstract mathematical formulas are seen as containing the concrete motions
of the heavenly bodies.
1. Socrates: For instance, were we to eliminate from all arts those of
numbering, measuring, and weighing, what would be left of any of them
would, broadly speaking, amount to very little. Philebus, 55 E. Cf. also
Epinomis, 977 C-E.
8. "Thus," said I, "these sparks that paint the sky, since they are
decorations on a visible surface, we must regard, to be sure, as the
fairest and most exact of material things; but we must recognize that they
fall far short of the truth, the movements, namely, of real speed and real
slowness in true number and in all true figures both in relation to one
. another and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain." Republic,
VII, 529 D-E.
9. To the man who pursues his studies in the proper way all geo
metrical constructions, all systems of numbers, all duly constituted
melodic progressions, the single ordered scheme of all celestial revolutions,
should disclose themselves, and disclose themselves they will, if as I say,
a man pursues his studies aright with his mind's eye fixed on their single
end. As such a man reflects, he will receive the revelation of a single
bond of natural interconnection between all these problems. Epinomis,
991 E-992 A.
10. Timaeus, 31 B-32 C.
1I. Timaeus, 53 C-D.
12. Timaeus, 52 D-53 B.
13. Cf. Phaedo, 96 A ff., where Socrates tells how' in his youth he
desired to know that part of philosophy called the investigation of
nature, but in pursuing its questions his eyes grew blind to things that he
seemed to know quite well, for example, that the growth of man is the
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result of eating and drinking. Now he does not believe that he under
stands the reason why one or anything else is destroyed, or generated,
or is at all.
14. Republic, 5ll D.
15. Physics, ii, 2, 194a7-12 (Oxford translation), and APo. I, 13, 78b3779a2.
16. The following example of how geometry is used to prove propo
sitions in optics is from Heath's Mathematics in Aristotle, Oxford, 1949,
p. 59. "The dependence of optics on geometry is seen in all books on
optics from Euclid's Optics onwards. Philoponus illustrates by the propo
sitions 'Things seen from afar appear smaller, things seen near at hand
appear larger' (Euclid's Optics, Prop. 5).
"Suppose an object CD seen by an eye at A, so that AC, AD are the
extreme 'visual rays,' as the Greeks called them. The object is therefore
seen in the angle CAD.
"Now suppose the eye moved nearer to the object, say to B; BC and
BD are then the extreme 'visual rays.'
c
"As B is within the triangle ACD, CB and DB
are straight lines drawn from the ends of the base
of a triangle to a point within the triangle. Hence
(Euclid, I, 21), the straight lines CB, BD are together
A
less than the straight lines CA, AD, but include a
greater angle. Therefore the angle CBD is greater
than the angle CAD. But (Euclid, Optics, Def. 4)
'Things seen under a greater angle appear greater
and under a lesser angle less.' Therefore from B the
object CD appears greater than it does from A."
17. Metaph., xi, 4, 106la29-106lb25.
18. Cf. P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans
lated by Philip P. Wiener, pp. 132 ff., for an excellent account of the
approximative nature of all measurement. Cf. also the work mentioned
in note 20 below, p. 275.
19. Aristotle seems to have been aware of the approximative nature
of practical mathematics. "The minute accuracy of mathematics is not
to be demanded in all cases, but only in the case of things which have
no matter. Hence, its method is not that of natural science." [Metaph., ii,
2 (995a 15-16).J I interpret this text as saying that absolute precision is
characteristic of pure mathematics and is not to be demanded of any
practical mathematical science. Contemporary physics is an example of
such a practical mathematical science.
This being so, it would logically follow that Aristotle would not make
the mistake of conceiving speculative mathematics, the geometry codified
by Euclid a half century after Aristotle's floruit, for example, as a science
of actual quantities. "Obviously physical bodies contain surfaces and
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volumes, lines and points, and these are the subject-matter of mathe
matics .... now the mathematician, though he too treats of these. things
[surfaces, volumes, etc.], nevertheless does not treat of them as the limits
of a physical body; nor does he consider the attributes indicated as the
attributes of such bodies. That is why he separates [abstracts] them; for
in thought they are separable from motion, and it makes no difference,
nor does any falsity result, if they are separated. . . . While Geometry
investigates physical lines, but not qua physical, Optics investigates
mathematical lines, but qua physical, not qua mathematical." [Physics,
ii, 2 (l 93b25-194al0).] This text clearly indicates that a discussion of
Euclidean versus non-Euclidean space would seem absurd to Aristotle, for
the characteristics of the idealized space of plane geometry arc a result of
abstracting from the actual dimensions of existing things. If one separates
the notions of line, surface, and volume from mutable and moving things,
he should not expect to find their characteristics as mutable and moving
in his abstractions; nor should he hope to measure actual things by his
abstractions.
20. Philipp Frank, in his Philosophy of Science, contemns the act of
"seeing" with the intellect as being essentially a pathway to self-delusion
in a metaphysics quite divorced from physics. He fails to account, how
ever, for the seeing with the intellect that has elaborated all mathematical
systems and all theoretical systems of physics. In fact, there is no possibility
of having any object of scientific knowledge until it is seen by the
intellect as having some possibility of yielding certain knowledge of a
universal kind. I take it that everyone agrees that what is seen by the
sense of sight, being material, is essentially changeable and therefore
not a fit object of scientific (true) knowledge. I think the PlatonicAristotelian disputation made perfectly evident the impossibility of having
a true knowledge of the object of the sense of sight, precisely and only
as an object of this sense. The stability that any object of scientific
investigation has is given to it when it is conceptualized; considered in
its state of material existence such an object is essentially mutable.
3. Does Physical "Knowledge" Require A Priori or
Undemonstrable Presuppositions?
HENRY MARGENAU

I. Mainly through the researches of R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of
Probability, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950.
2. P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics, The Macmillan
Company, New York, 1927.
3. Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, New York, 1950.
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4. l'aul Dcusscn, lHetaphysics, Macmillan and Company, London, 1894.
5. There are men who feel that previous illicit use has poisoned the
word metaphysical forever, and they prefer the term methodological. This
is all right with me, provided that I am not required to ab,indon every
word (e.g., force, action, energy) that has once suffered from grotesque
interpretation.
6. Philipp Frank, The hilidation of Scfrntific Theories, Tkanm Press,
Boston, 1954.
7. Alfred Lande, American Journal of Physics, 108_. 891, 1957; Foun
dations of Quantum Theon_. a Study in Continuity and Symmetry, Yale
University Press, "'-Jew Haven, 1955.
8. See A. Pap's incisive study, The A Priori in Physical Theory, King's
Crown Press, New York, 1946; also Semantics of Necessary Truth, Yale
llniversity Press, New Haven. 1958.
ll. I do not wish tu affirm this for all concepts of divine being; th<.'Ology,
in its clearer phases, does use methods of reasoning similar to those of
science and thereby removes some of the strictures implied in this
critique.
4. Does "Knowlt·dge" of Physical Laws and Fllcls Have Rele1.•rmce
in the ;Horal and Social Realm.1
GEORGE P. KLl'BERTANZ, S.J.

I. His two major works are Prinripin Ethica (Cambridge Pniversity
Press, Cambridge, 1903) and Ethics (Oxford l:niversity Press, New York,
1912).
2. See, for example, th<: presentation of these arguments in rwn of
the better-known wntemporary British writers, R. M. Hare, The Lan
guage of Morals (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952); P. Nowell-Smith, Ethics
!Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1954). But this does not mean that the
analysts intend to sllpport egoism or hedonism: sec Nowell-Smith, ojJ. cit.,
pp. 133-lH, or the summary given by T. E. Hill, Contemporary Ethical
Theories (!\facmillan, New York, 1950), pp. 25-26.
The analysts arc not alone in condemning the naturalistic fal!a,y. Sec,
for example, I'atrick Romanell, Toward a Critical Xaturulism (Mac
millan, New York, 19!'i8), p. 63, and F. S. C. Northrop, "Cultural Values,"
in Anthropology Today, edited by A. L. Krocber (Unhersity of Chicago
Press, Chitago. 195'1).
3. See Nowell-Smith, ofJ. cit., pp. 75-91; Hare, op. cit., pp. 79-93;
J. 0. Urmson, Philo,ophical Analysis (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956), p. 52.
I have not dealt with the Kantian a priori for several reasons. For
one thing, the arguments against intuitionism also count against a priori
forms. For another, the Kantian ethic is formal and "empty"; as Max
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Scheler pointed out, it is the material content that is important. Thirdly,
the Kantian ethic is one of duty; it does not recognize the moral ideal,
which is more inclusive than duty.
4. See, among others, Romanell, op. cit.; Northrop, op. cit.; Alexander
Sesonske, 17alue and Obligation (University of California Press, Berkeley,
1957); Maurice Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience
(Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1955): Morris Ginsberg, On the Diversity of
Morals (Macmillan, New York, 1957); Abraham Edel, Ethical Judgment:
The Use of Science in Ethics (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1955) (his new
book, with May Edel, Anthropology and Ethics [Charles C Thomas,
Springfield, Ill., 1959], should be a further development of his ideas).
5. Existentialist philosophers insist over and over that man has no
essence or nature. If this were meant literally, in the usual meaning of
the words, there would be neither good nor evil; everything would be
indifferent and arbitrary. But the existentialists also admit that there
is an objective "human situation"; and, even in the most radical formu
lation, there is a distinction between "authentic" and "inauthentic" acts.
By the word essence, therefore, they mean "an enclosed and necessitated
essence"; yet, if man is to be defined as consciousness and freedom, he
does have a nature, though in a different sense from the nonhuman
"objects" of the world.
6. If, with Romanell, op. cit., p. 55, we were to define "scientific
method" as "the continuous commitment to base conclusions on evidence,"
an ethics proceeding in the way here described could justly be called a
"scientific ethics." For a similar definition of "scientific," see also Harold
K. Schilling, "Teaching Reciprocal Relations between Natural Science and
Religion," in Teacher Education and Religion (American Association of
Colleges for Teacher Education, Oneonta, N. Y., 1959), for whom the
term "may refer to the general method of intelligence which, in attempt
ing to solve problems or answer qui;stions, proceeds logically, basing
conclusions on evidence and avoiding bias and prejudice" (p. 261), and
compare the usage of James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1951), pp. 42-62.
Yet this use of "scientific" is not to be altogether recommended, since
the term science is commonly used in several senses; on this ambiguity
and the possible misunderstandings that may arise from it, see Robert
J. Henle, S.J.. "A Philosopher's Interpretation of Anthropology's Contri
bution to the Understanding of Man," Anthropological Quarterly, 32,

29-31, 1959.

It should be noted that I am not here entering into the distinction
between the "knowledge of man as subject" and the "reduction of man to
the status of an object" (alleged to be the necessary consequence of a
scientific approach to man), so much insisted on by Gabriel Marcel and
other existentialists.
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7. On the contribution of anthropologists to a better knowledge of
man, and to a clearer delineation of the common needs and tendencies of
man, see, for example, Robert Redfield, "Anthropology's Contribution to
the Understanding of Man," Anthropological Quarterly, 32, 3-21, 1959;
Clyde Kluckhohn, "Universal Categories of Culture," and David Bidney,
"The Concept of Value in Modern Anthropology," in Anthropology To
day, edited by A. L. Kroeber (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953).
See, also, George St. Hilaire, S.J., "Cultural Relativism and Primitive Eth
ics," The Modern Schoolman, 36, 179-195, 1959.
Since writing this paper, I have had the opportunity to read Professor
Bridgman's latest book, The Way Things Are. Professor Bridgman says,
"There is something unique back of such a code [that is, a public code]
which to a certain extent determines it, independent of the particular cul
ture, namely, the traits which all human beings in all cultures have in
common and which condition the things which any human being will find
desirable. . . . From this point of view the attempts of anthropologists
and humanists to find a universal basis for human morals have a justifica
tion in nowise tainted by metaphysics." (Harvard University Press, Cam
bridge, 1959, p. 267.)
Remarkably similar conclusions are being reached by a number of
psychiatrists, who point out the destructive effects of the denial or per
version of the basic tendencies of man.
8. Readers familiar with Aristotelian or Thomistic philosophy will
recognize that this approach is only a partial analysis of the goal-directed
ness ("finality") of human nature. I have avoided the more common ter
minology, partly because it is often misunderstood, partly because in the
limitations of the space allotted to me I would not be able to present
adequately the entire argument from "finality." On this point, an inter
ested reader can profitably consult two excellent articles by John Wild,
"Tendency: The Ontological Ground of Ethics," Journal of Philosophy, 49,
468-472, 1952, and "Nature Law and Modern Ethical Theory," Ethics, 63,
1-13, 1952.
9. On the notion of "the reasonable" and the various ways in which it
is determined, see Thomas E. Davitt, S.J., "St. Thomas Aquinas and the
Natural Law," in Origins of the Natural Law Tradition, edited by Arthur
L. Harding (Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1954), pp. 26-46.
10. "What is morally good" includes more than "what is of obligation."
Once the basic meaning of "moral good" has been established, positive
obligation can be found by means of a further specification. The argument
would be developed, as I see it, along the following lines. Nature is dy
namically orientated, and this orientation is discovered through man's
natural tendencies. Moreover, one's own nature is a given in which reason
itself is contained. Practical reason proceeds from goals whose suitability
("fittingness") for man is within limits determined for nian. Therefore,
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man's judgments are found to be directed. Now, in the course of practical
reasoning, some actions (means) are found to be compatible with the
natural goals without being a sine qua non of them; and in this case we
find moral good desirable and ideal but not necessary. Other actions, how
ever, are found to be so related to the goals that the latter cannot be
seriously striven for without the former: in this case, there is obligation.
Finally, when man realizes that there is a moral (or, practical) absolute to
which he is directed, and that he is responsible to a personal higher being,
then moral obligation is experienced in its fullest sense.
IL According to the terminology I am using, "facts" are the "things
existing in space and time, and their relations" (cf. Morris R.. Cohen and
Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method [Harcourt,
Brace, New York, 1934], pp. 217-219), or the events which occur (have
occurred, will occur), as well as the propositions directly describing them.
"Laws" are "generalizations which assert invariable sequence, or conjunc
tion, or functional relationships between relatively directly observable or
measurable magnitudes" (cf. Cohen and Nagel, loc. cit., and Herbert
Feig!, "Some Remarks on the Meaning of Scientific Explanation," in Read
ings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by Herbert Feig! and Wilfrid Sellars
[Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1949], pp. 511-512). "Theories" are
higher-level generalizations (Feigl, loc. cit.) which consist of assumptions
to interpret laws and facts; they constitute the hypotheticodeductive mo
ment in science (F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the
Humanities [Macmillan, New York, 1947], pp. 59-75); they are "constructs"
(Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality [McGraw-Hill, New
York, 1950], pp. 54-74), which take the place for the scientist for real in•
trinsic natures that he cannot directly grasp but only attains by a mixed
experiential and rational process, the "empiriological method" (Jacques
Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, translated under the supervision of
Gerald B. Phelan [Scribner's, New York, 1959], pp. 21-67, 202-213). Theory,
therefore, is the distinctive and characteristic element in modern science.
5. Dualistic Pictures and Unitary Reality in Quantum Theory
ALFRED LANDE

I. Albert Einstein, Dialectica, 2, 320, 1948.
2. Erwin Schrodinger, Scientific Papers Presented to Max Born, Oliver
and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1953.
!l. Max Born, Philosophical Quarterly, J, 139, 1953.
4. Alfred Lande, American Journal of Physics, February 1959.
5. C. F. von Weizslicker, The World View of Physics, Chicago University
Press, Chicago, 1957, p. 33.
6. Henry Margenau, Philosophy of Science Journal, January 1958.
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7. K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discooery, revised English
translation, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1959.
8. W. Duane, Proceedings of the National Academy, 9, 158, 1923.
9. Niels Bohr in Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist, edited by P. A.
Schilpp, Library of Living Philosophers, Evanston, Illinois, 1949.
10. Alfred Lande, Foundations of Quantum Theory, a Study in Con
tinuity and Symmetry, Yale University Press, 1955; From Dualism to Unity
in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge University Press, 1960.
6. Metaphysics: Before or After Physics!
RAYMOND J, SEEGER

l. P. W. Bridgman, The Way Things Are, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1959.
2. Richard von Mises, Positivism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,

1951.
3. Alfred Lande, Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1955.
4. Philipp Frank, editor, The Validation of Scientific Theories, Beacon
Press, Boston, 1954.
5. Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, New York, 1950.
6. Philipp Frank, Philosophy of Science, Prentice-Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1957.
7. Max Born, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, Oxford Uni
versity Press, Fair Lawn, New Jersey, 1949.
8. R. J. Seeger, "Scientist and Theologian," Journal of the Washington
Academy of Sciences, 48, 145, 1958; "Scientist and Poet," American Scien
tist, 47, 350, 1959.

7. The Role of A Priori Elements in Physical Theory

..

ADOLF GRUNBAUM

l. For a concise recent statement of his views relevant here, cf. G. K.
Herburt, "The Analytic and the Synthetic," Philosophy of Science, 26, 104,

1959.
2. P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton
University Press, 1954, part II, chapter VI. This text, especially pp. 183190, will not bear the reading given by K. R. Popper (The Logic of Scien
tific Discovery, London, 1959, p. 78) to the effect that Duhem denies only
the possibility of crucial verifying experiments while allowing the possi
bility of decisively falsifying tests.
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3. Adolf Griinbaum, "The Duhemian Argument," Philosophy of Sci
ence, 27, 75-87, 1960.

4. Henri Poincare, The Foundations of Science, p. 76.
5. Albert Einstein, "Reply to Criticisms," in Albert Einstein: Philos•
opher-Scientist (edited by P. A. Schilpp), Library of Living Philosophers,
Evanston, Illinois, 1949, pp. 676-678.
6. For further details on the ramified logical foundations of Poincare's
geometric conventionalism and on the fundamental ways in which it dif
fers from the quasi-apriorism of Duhem, see Adolf Griinbaum, "The
Duhemian Argument," Philosophy of Science, 27, especially pp. 83-87,
1960; "Conventionalism in Geometry," in The Axiomatic Method in Geom
etry and Physics, Amsterdam, 1959, pp. 204-222; "Geometry, Chronometry
and Empiricism," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol.
III (forthcoming); and "Carnap's Views on the Foundations of Geometry,"
in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (edited by P. A. Schilpp), Tudor
Publishing Company, New York (forthcoming).
7. Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, London, 1937, p. 207.
A new translation of this work was published in New York in 1959 by
Charles Scribner's Sons; all page references here are to the 1937 trans
lation.
8. P. W. Bridgman, above, p. 21.
9. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 201-212
10. Ibid., p. 201.
11. Idem.
12. Ibid., p. 202.
13. Ibid., p. 203.
14. Ibid., p. 207.
15. Cf. ibid., p. 204.
16. Cf. ibid., p. 204
17. Ibid., p. 205.
18. Cf. ibid., pp. 202, 205-206.
19. Ibid., pp. 206-207.
20. Hilbert and Bernays, Grundlagen der Mathematik, Berlin, 1934,
vol. I, §1, section A, pp. 2-3.
21. Cf. L. P. Eisenhart, Coordinate Geometry, New York, 1960, appen
dix to chapter I, pp. 279-292.
22. Shankland, McCuskey, Leone, and Kuerti, Reviews of Modern
Physics, 27, 167, 1955.
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